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Abstract 
In this work, we analyze the legal requirements on how cookie banners are supposed to be implemented to 
be fully compliant with the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR.  
Our contribution resides in the definition of 17 operational and fine-grained requirements on cookie banner 
design that are legally compliant, and moreover, we define whether and when the verification of compliance 
of each requirement is technically feasible.  
The definition of requirements emerges from a joint interdisciplinary analysis composed of lawyers and 
computer scientists in the domain of web tracking technologies. As such, while some requirements are 
provided by explicitly codified legal sources, others result from the domain-expertise of computer 
scientists. In our work, we match each requirement against existing cookie banners design of websites. For 
each requirement, we exemplify with compliant and non-compliant cookie banners.  
As an outcome of a technical assessment, we verify per requirement if technical (with computer science 
tools) or manual (with any human operator) verification is needed to assess compliance of consent and we 
also show which requirements are impossible to verify with certainty in the current architecture of the Web.  
For example, we explain how the GDPR’s requirement for revocable consent could be implemented in 
practice: when consent is revoked, the publisher should delete the consent cookie and communicate the 
withdrawal to all third parties who have previously received consent.  
With this approach we aim to support practically-minded parties (compliance officers, regulators, privacy 
NGOs, researchers, and computer scientists) to assess compliance and detect violations in cookie banners’ 
design and implementation, specially under the current revision of the EU ePrivacy framework.  
Keywords: legal compliance, cookies and similar technologies, consent, cookie banners, General Data 
Protection Regulation, ePrivacy Directive, web tracking technologies, legal requirements, technical 
verification, ePrivacy Regulation, detection of violations 
1. Introduction 
The ePrivacy Directive1 2002/58/EC, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC stipulates the need for consent 
for the storage of or access to cookies (and any tracking technologies, e.g. device fingerprinting) on the 
user’s terminal equipment, as the lawfulness ground, pursuant to Article 5(3) thereof. The rationale behind 
this obligation aims to give users control of their data. Hence, website publishers processing personal data 
are duty-bound to collect consent. Consequently, an increasing number of websites now display (cookie) 
consent banners.2 
However, there is no established canonical form for the consent request. It is clear from Recital 17 of the 
ePD that a user’s consent may be given by any appropriate method. Website operators are free to use or 
develop consent flows that suits their organization, as long as this consent can be deemed valid under EU 
                                               
1 In this paper we will only regard to the recent amended version of the ePrivacy Directive, the Directive 2009/136/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 337, 11–36 (hereinafter named ‘ePD’) . 
2 Jannick Sørensen, Sokol Kosta, ‘Before and After GDPR: The Changes in Third Party Presence at Public and Private 
European Websites’ (Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, ACM, NY, USA, 2019)1590–1600.  
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legislation (Article 29 Working Party, WP259 rev.01).3-4 As such, excessive focus is being placed on the 
manufacturing of consent, taken up by consent management platforms and tools. The most known ways to 
collect consent is through ‘cookie banners’, or also often referred to as prompts, overlays, cookie bars, 
cookie pop-up-boxes that pop up or slide atop websites prominently.5 Their design and functionality differ 
– the simplest banners merely state that the website uses cookies without any options, whereas the most 
complex allow users to individually (de)select each third-party service used by the website. 
Amid information overload and the development of manipulative dark patterns6-7-8 that lead to nudging 
users to consent, data subjects are not always able to easily understand the outcomes of data collection, and 
the use of their data. 
The assessment as to whether or not cookie banner designs implemented by website operators fulfil all the 
requirements for valid consent, as stipulated by the General Data Protection Regulation9  (hereinafter named 
GDPR), is considered in the guidelines of both the Article 29 Working Party and Data Protection 
Authorities (hereinafter named 29WP and DPAs), as described in section 6.2. These guidelines provide a 
useful framework of what is a valid consent for cookie banners, but they do not define how to assess, in 
practice, their legal compliance. These guidelines consist mostly on interpretative elements yet rendering 
still a vague guidance on the consent elements implementation. Even though Recital 66 of the ePD disposes 
that ‘the enforcement of these requirements should be made more effective by way of enhanced powers 
granted to the relevant National Authorities’, this point is still under work, despite the recent guidelines 
issued by the UK, French, German, Irish, Danish, Finish and Spanish DPAs. The legislative provisions in 
the GDPR are purposefully general to cover a range of different scenarios, including unanticipated future 
developments. The ePD Directive does not sketch procedures to guide the enforcement of its principles, 
nor provides guidelines to perform systematic audits. Moreover, the lack of automatic tools which can 
verify whether a website violates the legislative instruments makes it possibly complicated for the deputed 
agencies to plan systematic audits. 
The consequence of not complying with the requirements for a valid consent renders the consent invalid 
and the controller may be in breach of Article 6 of the GDPR. Hence, the controller may be subject to fines 
(Article 83).10 
We consider in this work that there is a need for a technical perspective in the analysis of a valid consent 
for browser-based tracking technologies (including cookies), as processing operations of web services are 
technology intensive. This means that the use of the technology underlying processing operations is such, 
that specific guidance on the use of that technology is needed to adequately protect personal data, while 
managing cookies on the server side, the third-party side, and also on the side of designers and/or developers 
of websites. We state that a privacy by design approach, as posited in Article 25 of the GDPR, advocates 
                                               
3 In this paper, we provide many excerpts of the opinions and guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party. For readability 
and presentation purposes, we convey in the text of the article the abbreviation ‘29WP’, followed by the reference 
number of each opinion. Even if the European Data Protection Board has endorsed the endorsed the GDPR related 
WP29 Guidelines, for simplicity purposes, we only mention Article 29 Working Party.  
4 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (WP259 rev.01, 10 April 2018). 
5 For example, the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (henceforth named CNIL) decided to 
remove its cookie banner and to leave no tracer until the user has consented by going actively to the cookie management 
menu or directly through the content pages. This choice not to use a banner is neither an obligation nor a 
recommendation for other websites that are free to adopt solutions tailored to their situation, in compliance with 
Regulations, CNIL, ‘The legal framework relating to consent has evolved, and so does the website of the CNIL’ (2019) 
<www.cnil.fr/en/legal-framework-relating-consent-has-evolved-and-so-does-website-cnil> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
6 Harry Brignull, ‘What are Dark Patterns?’ (2018) <https://darkpatterns.org> accessed 11 December 2019. 
7 Colin M. Gray, Yubo Kou, Bryan Battles, Joseph Hoggatt, and Austin L. Toombs, ‘The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX 
Design’ (Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems ACM, New York, USA, 2018). 
8 CNIL’s 6th Innovation and Foresight Report ‘Shaping Choices in the Digital World, ‘From dark patterns to data 
protection: the influence of UX/UI design on user empowerment’ (2019) <https://linc.cnil.fr/fr/ip-report-shaping-
choices-digital-world> accessed 11 December 2019. 
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1 (hereafter, ‘GDPR’). 
10 The Data Protection Authority of Baden-Württemberg (henceforth called German DPA) acknowledges that if consent 
is required but not effectively granted, the setting or reading of a cookie is unlawful and data controllers face both the 
prohibition of data processing and fines, LfDI Baden-Württemberg, ‘On the use of cookies and cookie banners - what 
must be done with consent (ECJ ruling ‘Planet49’)?’ (2019) <www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/zum-einsatz-
von-cookies-und-cookie-bannern-was-gilt-es-bei-einwilligungen-zu-tun-eugh-urteil-planet49/>, accessed 21 
November 2019. 
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good technical design which embeds privacy into IT systems and business practices from the outset (and 
doesn’t just add privacy measures ex-post).  
Our aim is to identify the requirements for a valid consent to assess compliance of cookie banners.  Our 
intention is to contribute to closing the gap between existing guidelines, interpretations and practices by 
constructing a list of requirements that may help practically-minded players (e.g. compliance officers, 
regulators, privacy NGOs, researchers, IT researchers, web services business owners and other services 
concerned with the design or operation of web services) to discern compliant banner designs and to spot 
the invalid ones.  
This paper makes the following contributions: 
• We have identified the legal-technical requirements for valid consent of cookie banners and their 
violations; 
• We have matched the requirements against existing design patterns of cookie banners and 
illustrated each requirement for valid consent with compliant and non-compliant cookie banners; 
• We have analyzed how compliance with each requirement can be verified: either with a human 
operator and/or with technical means via automatic detection tools. 
The remainder of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the methodology adopted to construe the 
requirements for a valid consent for cookie banners. Section 3 provides the background knowledge of the 
paper, the terminology, the scope and exclusions of this work. Section 4 expounds on each of the 
requirements and sub-requirements for a valid consent for cookie banners, providing compliant and non-
compliant examples and the means to verify compliance. Section 5 discusses scenarios and consequences 
of a shared consent. Section 6 analyses the related work section on consent elements applied to cookie 
banner design. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
2. Methodology 
In our work, we follow a bottom-up approach, using granular content from the elicited legal sources, such 
as normative provisions and recitals from legislation (GDPR and ePD), paragraphs from specific case-law 
and concrete arguments from the guidelines of the 29WP and the ones of DPAs to build the devised 
requirements. 
We analyzed its constituents separately for the general consent, and afterwards, we delved into the 
specificities of consent dedicated to browser-based tracking technologies (henceforth named BTT), 
including cookies. We have expanded our analysis with a regulatory overview of decisions issued by the 
European Court of Justice of the EU, and the ones emanated from the DPAs guidelines on the use of 
cookies. Whenever possible, we give a comparative analysis of the DPAs guidelines and we consider the 
most important aspects of the ePrivacy Regulation (in its last known version of 19 November 2019). We 
also accounted legal scholarship to analyze some requirements.  
In websites, consent for cookies is usually presented in a form of cookie banners. A cookie banner is a mean 
for getting user’s consent on the usage of cookies and potentially other web application technologies that 
can store data or use browser attributes to recognize the user’s browser, such as browser fingerprinting.11 
The paper proposes 17 operational and fine-grained requirements on cookie banner design and we also 
identify violations. The definition of requirements emerged from a joint interdisciplinary analysis 
composed of lawyers and computer scientists experts in the domain of web browsers and web tracking 
technologies. The combined expertise was conducive to inspect legal and technical effects and the practical 
implementation of each requirement.  
Whilst deciphering each requirement and the respective sub-requirements, we propose a description thereof, 
consisting of a concise designation of a requirement (e.g. ‘Prior to setting cookies’), and followed by its 
concrete and objective explanation (e.g. consent must be obtained before cookies requiring consent are set). 
For readability purposes, we additionally extend this description, whenever possible, with further 
observations and the counterpart violations of the requirements.  
As a result of a technical assessment, for each requirement, we verified if technical or manual checking is 
needed for a valid consent, e.g. only by technical means it is possible to determine the case of prior consent 
for setting cookies. Whereas some of the requirements are backed in explicit codified legal sources, others 
result from the domain-expertise of computer scientists. For example, we explain how the GDPR’s 
                                               
11 Pierre Laperdrix, Nataliia Bielova, Benoit Baudry, Gildas Avoine, ‘Browser Fingerprinting: A survey’ (2019) 
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.01051> accessed 11 December 2019.  
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requirement for revocable consent could be implemented in practice: when consent is revoked, the publisher 
should delete the consent cookie and communicate the withdrawal to all third parties who have previously 
received consent.  
We have also pursued with our own interpretation regarding some requirements, demarking our explicit 
positioning, for example, we discuss to what extent ‘consent walls’ are allowed under current EU rules. 
Our requirement of ‘no consent wall’ (explained in section 5.6 of this paper), means that a website needs 
to be accessible, even if the user did not give a positive consent. If there are other ways to show the banner 
without being unnecessarily disruptive to access the service, then such banner is preferred to a consent wall.  
We have matched the requirements against existing design patterns of cookie banners. We illustrate each 
requirement for valid consent with compliant and non-compliant cookie banners.  
We have performed a legal expert validation12 to further improve the requirements. A comparative analysis 
of the existing Data Protection Authorities guidelines on the use of cookies is performed whenever 
appropriate.  
3. Background 
In this section, we outline a summary of the legal fabric mostly related to cookies and other browser-based 
technologies, personal data collection and consent as reflected in a cookie banner. 
The digital economy is increasingly dominated by service providers that collect and process vast amounts 
of personal data. Web services are a central part of the interface of any organization for the dissemination 
of information, collection of input and more complex transactions. We assume that web services process 
personal data,13 and therefore, these web services must be operated in compliance with the privacy and data 
protection principles, so that the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data are 
guaranteed. Examples of personal data abound: data that enables users to log-in into the web service for 
authentication and customization purposes, IP addresses, user identifiers, timestamps, URLs of the visited 
pages and other parameters that enable the user to be singled-out. Usage of cookies for storing identifiers 
are explicitly mentioned on Recital 30 of the GDPR:  
Natural persons may be associated with online identifiers provided by their devices, applications, 
tools and protocols, such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers. (…) 
This may leave traces which, in particular when combined with unique identifiers and other 
information received by the servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons and identify 
them. 
It is noteworthy that personal data do not consist only in the data originally collected via the web service, 
but also in any other information that the controller collected through other means and that can be linked to 
personal data collected through the web service. It also means any other information inferred that relates to 
an individual. The European Data Protection Supervisor (hereinafter named EDPS) declares that the use of 
device fingerprinting can lead to a certain percentage of assurance that two different sets of data collected 
belong to the same individual.14 Thus, the GDPR applies to data that can identify users (i.e., when 
identification of users is likely), whether they are meant or used to track online activity of such users. 
In general, any use of tracking technologies15 which involves the processing of personal data, whether to 
identify directly (e.g. an email address) or more often to identify indirectly (e.g. unique cookie identifier, 
IP address, device identifier or component of the device, device fingerprinting, identifier generated by a 
software program or operating system) must comply with the GDPR. While many cookies indeed contain 
unique identifiers, it does not hold to all types of data; for example, some of them carry information which 
is too coarse to identify users, while several of them can be combined to uniquely identify users. As such, 
website operators need to consider cookies as storage mechanisms that may potentially contain personal 
data and therefore protect it accordingly. Cookies used for tracking users’ online activities are unique 
                                               
12 We have consulted the legal scholars Frederik Borgesius and Gaëtan Goldberg to check each requirement.  
13 Personal data means any information relating to an identified or (directly or indirectly) identifiable natural person. 
In determining whether the information relates to an identifiable individual, website publishers need to consider any 
means that could reasonably be used by them or any third party to enable the identification of an individual, according 
to Art. 4(1) and Recital 26 of the GDPR. For a deeper analysis of this concept, see Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 
4/2007 on the concept of personal data’ (WP 136, 20 June 2007).  
14 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Opinion 6/2017 on the Proposal for a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications (ePrivacy Regulation)’, Abril 2017, 14 (henceforth named EDPS Opinion). 
15 Irene Kamara, Eleni Kosta, ‘Do Not Track initiatives: regaining the lost user control’ (2016) International Data 
Privacy Law, Volume 6, 276–290.  
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identifiers used to single them out and recognize returning website visitors. As a result, such tracking 
cookies are personal data as defined in the GDPR, even if the traditional identity parameters (name, address, 
etc.) of the tracked user are unknown or have been deleted by the tracker after collection. 
The ePD prescribes that websites obtain users’ informed consent before using any kind of tracking 
technology. Article 2(f)16 and Recital 1717 of the 2002 ePD define consent in reference to the one set forth 
in Directive 95/46/EC.18 The subsequent GDPR points out the conditions for obtaining valid consent in 
Articles 4(11) and 7 of the GDPR.  Article 4(11) of the GDPR provides for the elements composing a valid 
consent: ‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by 
which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of 
personal data relating to him or her’. The GDPR provides additional guidance in Article 7 and in Recitals 
32, 33, 42, and 43 as to how the controller must act to comply with the main elements of the consent 
requirement. 
3.1. Scope of the paper 
This paper focuses on legal requirements relating to the processing of personal data from/onto the users’ 
devices through cookies and similar technologies. In particular, within the scope of this work, we refer to 
the use of cookies, and any similar technologies (browser-based tracking technology) to be stored, executed 
and read on the user´s terminal device, and thus falling within the scope of Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive, which is worded as follows, 
Member States shall ensure that the storing of information, or the gaining of access to 
information already stored, in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on 
condition that the subscriber or user concerned has/ given his or her consent, having been 
provided with clear and comprehensive information, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC, 
inter alia, about the purposes of the processing. This shall not prevent any technical storage or 
access for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an 
electronic communications network, or as strictly necessary in order for the provider of an 
information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user to provide the service. 
3.2. Terminology  
Article 5(3) of the ePD applies to providers that store or gain access to information in the terminal 
equipment of the subscriber or user. Account must be taken to these four framing elements below:  
• Subscriber and/or user  
• Terminal equipment 
• Browser-based tracking technology 
• Provider of an information society service 
The subscriber means the person who pays the bill for the use of the online service. The user is the person 
using either the computer or any other device to access the online service. In many cases the subscriber and 
the user can coincide, for example, when an individual uses the broadband connection to access a website 
on his computer or mobile device – this person would be both the ‘user’, as well as the ‘subscriber’, if he 
pays for the connection. However, this is not always the case, since end-users might include employees, 
tenants, hotel guests, family members, visitors, and any other individuals who are using the services, for 
private or business purposes, without necessarily having subscribed to it. Following the example given by 
the UK DPA, if a family member or a visitor visits this subscriber’s home and uses his internet connection 
to access that service from their own device, he would be the user.19 
The ePD does not specify from whom the consent is required. The legislator did not preview which consent 
takes precedence (the user’s or the subscriber’s), nor if that choice should be at the discretion of the entity 
                                               
16 Art. 2(f) reads that ‘consent by a user or subscriber corresponds to the data subject's consent in Directive 95/46/EC’. 
17 Recital 17 provides that ‘for the purposes of this Directive, consent of a user or subscriber, regardless of whether the 
latter is a natural or a legal person, should have the same meaning as the data subject's consent as defined and further 
specified in Directive 95/46/EC’. 
18 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 1995 L 281/31. 
19 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Guidance on the rules on use of cookies and similar 
technologies’, Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, (2019) 9 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/guide-to-pecr/guidance-on-the-use-of-cookies-and-similar-technologies-1-0.pdf> accessed 11 
December 2019 (henceforth named ICO Guidance). 
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that stores or gains access to the information.20 Whilst the web publisher, in principle, is not meant to 
distinguish between a consent provided by the subscriber or the user, what is relevant is that one of the 
parties must deliver a valid consent against cookie-related information in the landing page. Surmounting 
this qualification, the EDPS21 recommends including a stand-alone definition of end-user in the 
forthcoming ePrivacy Regulation, for purposes of providing consent, to ensure that it is the individuals 
effectively using the service, rather than those subscribing to it. 
Terminal equipment refers to a device where information is accessed or stored, e.g. desk computers, 
laptop, pads, smartphones, but also other equipment such as wearable technologies, smart TVs, game 
consoles, connected vehicles, voice assistants, as well as any other object that is connected to an electronic 
communication network open to the public.  
Our understanding of the term web service refers to any type of information service made accessible over 
the internet with which users interact usually through web browsers, mobile apps or other client software. 
IoT web services, accessed by IoT devices, are included. 
A browser-based tracking technology (henceforth named BTT), the third element of this quadrant, is 
commonly acknowledged as any technology which enables the reading or storing of information from/onto 
the users’ devices for tracking purposes, in line with the text of Article 5(3) of the ePD. A typical example 
of BTT are browser cookies, but since the appearance of alternative tracking technologies that either rely 
on other browser storages of use browser fingerprinting, in this paper we unify all such technologies under 
the terminology of BTT.  
Browser tracking technologies include, for example, in the context of web applications: 
• HTTP cookies; 
• Web caching mechanisms, such as ETag and LastModified header; 
• HTML5 localStorage and sessionStorage APIs; 
• Browser fingerprinting technologies.22 
There is still a distinction to be made between first and third-party BTT, in particular first- and third party 
cookies. Even if such distinction exists in practice, the GDPR does not seem to differentiate them, and 
therefore users have the right to reject both types of cookies. Following the definitions provided by the 
29WP (WP194),23 the term first party cookie is used to refer to a cookie set by the data controller (or any 
of its processors) operating the website visited by the user, as defined by the URL that is usually displayed 
in the browser address bar.  The term third party cookie to describe cookies that are set by data controllers 
that do not operate the website currently visited by the user. Web publishers often include third party content 
in their websites (e.g. from an advertising network, a streaming video service, social networking plugins or 
other content providers). Such content can also set and read their own cookies on a user’s device. By setting 
in and reading their own cookies from the user’s device, third parties can recognize and track the user even 
if he has never visited the corresponding third-party server directly. These cookies can store personal 
information, such as the visited web service or the date of visit, together with a user identifier that is unique 
for the third-party web service and allows it to build a profile of the user. As a result, both cookies – set by 
the site the user requested, and by third party content, – can be set and read from users’ devices (hence 
named as first party and third-party cookies).  
The provider of an information society service (i.e. a publisher) provides a website content service. 
3.3. Scoping browser-based tracking technologies requiring or exempted from consent 
In this paper, we only refer to the use of BTT requiring consent. According to Article 5(3) of the ePD, 
consent is not required when the purpose of trackers is: 
• Communication: used for the sole purpose of enabling the communication on the web; and  
• Strict necessity: cookies strictly necessary to enable the service requested by the user: if cookies 
are disabled, the service will not work.         
                                               
20Eleni Kosta, ‘Peeking into the cookie jar: the European approach towards the regulation of cookies’ 
(2013) International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 21, Issue 4, 380–406 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eat011> accessed 11 December 2019.  
21EDPS Opinion (n 14) 14. 
22 cf Laperdrix (n 11). 
23 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (WP 194, 7 June 2012), henceforth 
named 29WP (WP194). 
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The 29WP (WP194) analyzed these two exceptions accordingly: 
• The communication exemption applies when the transmission of the communication is impossible 
without the use of the cookie. Hence, using TBB to merely ‘assist’ or ‘facilitate’ the 
communication is insufficient.  
• The strict necessity exemption involves a narrow interpretation. It means that the storage of or 
access to information using cookies may only be considered strictly necessary (and hence 
essential). Thus, using TBB that is reasonably necessary or important to provide a service. This 
criterion implies that the service provided by the website operator, at the request of the user, would 
not function without the cookies. In this regard, the choice of a certain functionality that relies on 
cookies is not enough to justify the strict necessity if the web publisher has a different 
implementation choice that would work without cookies. Moreover, this criterion does not cover 
what could be essential for any other uses that a publisher wishes to make of that piece of data.  
Both the 29WP and DPAs provide explicit examples of TBB that require the user’s consent. They assert 
that the following purposes for TBB are usually not strictly necessary to the user visiting a website, since 
they are usually related to a functionality that is distinct from the service that has been explicitly requested: 
• advertising, and use of the data for marketing, research and audience measurement are not strictly 
necessary to deliver a service that is requested by a user (29WP (WP240));24 
• third party cookies (29WP (WP194) and German DPA).25 
We believe that such statement refers to the technical functionality of cookies instead of their purpose. In 
some situations, third-party cookies may be used for purposes, such as user input, authentication and 
security, which are usually exempted from consent.  
We will further analyze which TBB are exempted from consent based solely on their purpose, and not on 
their technical abilities. Ultimately, as the 29WP (WP194) exposes, it is thus the purpose and the specific 
implementation or processing being achieved that must be used to determine whether or not a cookie can 
be exempted from consent’. 
The 29WP (WP194) clarifies further that when applying the exemptions for obtaining consent, it is 
important to examine what is strictly necessary from the point of view of the user, not of the service provider.  
We classify the purposes of BTT that generally require consent and the ones that are exempted. Regarding 
multipurpose BTT, whenever a BTT covers different purposes (e.g. can be used for the purpose of 
remembering user preferences and for the purpose of tracking), the website still needs to seek user consent 
for the tracking purposes. The 29WP recalls that in practice, this should encourage website owners to use 
a different TBB for each distinct purpose. 
For this classification of the purposes of BTT, we relied on the guidance from the 29WP.26-27 For a 
comparative analysis, we also consulted the recent guidelines from DPAs (ICO, CNIL, German and Dutch 
DPA). This classification is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the evaluation and review of the e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC)’, 
(WP 240, 19 July 2016). 
25 The German DPA declares that ‘Consent banners must be used if the user's consent is actually required, in particular 
when data is passed on to third parties or third parties are given the opportunity to collect data.  Examples include 
analytics tools, social media plugins, external map services, and other third party elements’, see The State 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information in Baden-Württemberg (LfDI BW) ‘Guidelines for 
Telemedia Providers’, (2019) <www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/Orientierungshilfe-der-Aufsichtsbeh%C3%B6rden-f%C3%BCr-Anbieter-von-
Telemedien.pdf > accessed 11 December 2019 (henceforth named German DPA Guidelines). 
26 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioural advertising’, (WP 171, 22 June 2010). 
27 cf 29WP (WP194) (n 23). 
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Table 1 Examples of purposes of BTT exempted and non-exempted of consent. 
Purposes exempted of consent Purposes needed of consent 
 
Local Analytics – These are defined by the 29WP as 
statistical audience measuring tools for website 
owners. BTTs (often first-party cookies) can be used 
for counting the number of unique visits to a website, 
how long users stay in the site, what parts of the 
website they visit, detecting main search keywords 
that lead to a webpage, track website navigation 
issues. The 29WP and the EDPS28 strictly exempts 
from consent insofar they are limited to first party 
anonymized and aggregated statistical purposes, as 
these are not likely to create a privacy risk. The 
proposal of the Council (November 2019) on the 
ePrivacy Regulation29 also underlines the same idea. 
The CNIL30 points out that certain analytic cookies 
can be exempted from prior consent if they meet a list 
of cumulative requirements. The Dutch DPA31 states 
that analytical cookies may be limited, and these may 
have little or no effect on the privacy of visitors. 
Non-local Analytics – Even if website owner relies on self-claims 
of ‘strictly necessary’ first party analytics, the 29WP32 says that 
they are not strictly necessary to provide a functionality explicitly 
requested by the user, because the user can access all the 
functionalities provided by the website when such cookies are 
disabled. As a consequence, these cookies do not fall under the 
exemption of consent.  
Both the ICO33 and the German DPA34 held that third-party 
analytics cookies are not strictly necessary. 
                                               
28 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on the protection of personal data processed through web services 
provided by EU institutions’ (2016) 10-13 (henceforth named EDPS Guidelines). 
29 Article 8(1) (d) of the Council’s proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation reads that,   
‘the use of processing and storage capabilities of terminal equipment and the collection of information from 
end-users’ terminal equipment, shall be prohibited, except if it is necessary for web audience measuring, 
provided that such measurement is carried out by the provider of the information society service requested 
by the end-user or by a third party, or by third parties jointly, on behalf of the one or more providers of the 
information society service provided that conditions laid down in Article 28, or where applicable Article 
26, of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 are met’, 
 Council’s proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation (2019) <www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/file.pdf> 
accessed 11 December 2019. 
30 The Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés, in its Guidelines, prescribes that cookies used to 
measure audiences on a web site or mobile app may be exempt from consent if the following conditions are met:  
‘i. such cookies must be put in place by the web publisher or his processor; ii. the user must be informed 
and must be able to object to the use of such cookies on all devices, operating systems, applications and 
browsers; iii. the purpose of such cookies must be limited to: (1) measuring the audience that views a 
content in order to assess the content that is published or the ergonomics of a website or mobile app, 
excluding any form of unique targeting of individuals; (2) clustering of website audiences to assess the 
efficiency of the web editing choices that are made; (3) enabling overall dynamic changes to be made to a 
website. iv. the data collected must not be combined or merged with other types of data (e.g. client accounts 
or statistics about another website) nor disclosed to third parties; v. the use of trackers must be strictly 
limited to producing anonymous statistics; vi. the trackers may only be used by one publisher of content 
and must not enable tracking a user over different websites or mobile apps; v. the IP address cannot be used 
to geolocate the user more precisely than the city. Such IP address must be deleted or anonymised once the 
user has been located to avoid this data from being used or combined with other data’,  
see Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés, ‘Délibération n° 2019-093 du 4 juillet 2019 portant 
adoption de lignes directrices relatives à l'application de l'article 82 de la loi du 6 janvier 1978 modifiée aux opérations 
de lecture ou écriture dans le terminal d'un utilisateur (notamment aux cookies et autres traceurs) (rectificatif)’ (2019) 
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000038783337> accessed 11 December 2019 
(henceforth named CNIL Guidelines). 
31 An explanation of the legal requirements for cookies (besides tracking cookies) is available on the website of the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), ‘Cookies’ (2019) 
<www.acm.nl/nl/onderwerpen/telecommunicatie/internet/cookies> accessed 11 December 2019. 
32 Regarding first-party analytics, the 29WP (WP194) (n 23) 10 considers that, 
‘first party analytics cookies are not likely to create a privacy risk when they are strictly limited to first 
party aggregated statistical purposes and when they are used by websites that already provide clear 
information about these cookies in their privacy policy as well as adequate privacy safeguards. Such 
safeguards are expected to include a user-friendly mechanism to opt out from any data collection and 
comprehensive anonymization mechanisms that are applied to other collected identifiable information such 
as IP addresses’. 
33 The ICO declares that it is ‘unlikely that priority for any formal action would be given to uses of cookies where there 
is a low level of intrusiveness and low risk of harm to individuals’ and first party analytics cookies are given as an 
example of cookies that are potentially low risk, cf ICO Guidance (n 19).  
34 cf German DPA Guidelines (n 25). 
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Session User input – The 29WP these are used to keep 
track of the user’s input (session-id) when filling 
online forms over several pages, or as a shopping cart, 
to keep track of the items the user has selected by 
clicking on a button. These cookies are clearly needed 
to provide an information service explicitly requested 
by the user, for the duration of a session. Additionally, 
they are tied to a user action (such as clicking on a 
button or filling a form). 
Advertising – The 29WP affirms that third party advertising 
cookies requires consent. It further clarifies that consent would 
also be needed for operational purposes related to third party 
advertising, such as frequency capping, financial logging, ad 
affiliation, click fraud detection, research and market analysis, 
product improvement and debugging.35 Even though the 29WP 
only distinguishes third-party advertising, we believe that the 
category of purposes should only be called ‘Advertising’. We 
insist on it because it’s been observed that first-party cookies are 
also often synchronized with third-party cookies, and moreover 
publishers started hiding advertising content under the first-party 
content (typical case is with DNS redirection that has been 
recently observed on a French media website, liberation.fr.).  
The ICO36 posits that while advertising cookies may be crucial in 
the eyes of a website or mobile app operator as they bring in 
revenue to fund the service, they are not ‘strictly necessary’ from 
the point of view of the website user and hence, the law. The 
Dutch DPA37 names these as tracking cookies and advises 
companies to request consent to place tracking cookies. The same 
reasoning holds for the German DPA.38 
 
User-security for a service explicitly requested by the 
user– The 29WP names these due to their function on 
providing security functionalities for a service the user 
has requested (e.g. online banking services) and for a 
limited duration. E.g. to detect repeated failed login 
attempts on a website, or other similar mechanisms 
designed to protect the login system from abuses. 
 
User-security for a service not explicitly requested by the user – 
The 29WP39 refers to cookies providing security for a content not 
explicitly requested by the user. For example, if a website uses an 
advertising content that contains user-security cookies, such as 
those of Cloudflare, then the user consent is required.40 
Social media plugin for a functionality explicitly 
requested by the user – The 29WP refers that many 
social networks propose ‘social plug-in modules’ that 
website owners integrate in their platform, to provide 
some services than can be considered as ‘explicitly 
requested’ by their members, e.g. to allow their 
members to share contents they like with their ‘friends’ 
(and propose other related functionalities such as 
publishing comments). These plug-ins store and access 
cookies in the user’s terminal equipment in order to 
allow the social network to identify their members 
when they interact with these plug-ins. 
Social media plugin for a functionality not requested by the user 
– The 29WP refers that these ‘social plug-in modules’ can also 
be used to track users: logged-in, ‘non-logged-in’ users, and also 
non-members. We conclude however that even logged-in 
members can be tracked and therefore name this category as 
‘functionality not requested by the user’.  
The German DPA41 has the same position.   
 
Session Authentication – The 29WP describes these 
as the ones used to identify the user once he has 
logged-in into websites, for the duration of a session. 
They allow users to authenticate themselves on 
successive loads of the website and gain access to 
authorized content or functionality, such as viewing 
their account balance, transactions in an online 
Persistent Authentication – The 29WP says also that persistent 
login cookies which store an authentication token across browser 
sessions are not exempted of consent. This is an important 
distinction because the user may not be immediately aware of the 
fact that closing the browser will not clear their authentication 
settings. They may return to the website under the assumption 
                                               
35 cf. 29WP (WP194) (n 23) 9-10. 
36 cf ICO Guidance (n 19) 39. 
37Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘Cookies’ (2019) <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/onderwerpen/internet-
telefoon-tv-en-post/cookies#mag-ik-als-organisatie-een-cookiewall-gebruiken-7111 > accessed 11 December 2019 
(henceforth named Dutch DPA). 
38 cf German DPA Guidelines (n 25). 
39 According to the 29WP the consent exemption does not cover the use of cookies that relate to the security of websites 
or third-party services that have not been explicitly requested by the user, (WP194) (n 23) 7. 
40See the following purpose of a cookie ‘__cfduid’ used by Cloudflare for detection of malicious visitors:  
‘The _cfduid cookie helps Cloudflare detect malicious visitors to our Customers’ websites and minimizes 
blocking legitimate users. It may be placed on the devices of our customers' End Users to identify individual 
clients behind a shared IP address and apply security settings on a per-client basis. It is necessary for 
supporting Cloudflare's security features’. 
 Such cookie requires consent when it is used by Cloudflare in advertising content or other content not explicitly 
requested by the user, Cloudflare, ‘Understanding the Cloudflare Cookies’ (2019) 
<https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/200170156-What-does-the-Cloudflare-cfduid-cookie-do-> accessed 
2 December 2019.  
41 cf German DPA Guidelines (n 25). 
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banking website, online shopping. This authentication 
functionality is an essential part of the service a user 
explicitly requests. 
that they are anonymous whilst in fact they are still logged in to 
the service. 
Short-term User Interface Customization (or 
personalization and design cookies) – According to 
the 29WP, these are used to store a user’s preference 
regarding a service across web pages and not linked to 
other persistent identifiers such as usernames. These 
are explicitly enabled by the user, e.g. by clicking on 
a button or ticking a box to keep a language, display 
format, fonts, etc. Only session (or short term) cookies 
storing such information are exempted. 
Long-term User Interface Customization – The 29WP says that 
the addition of information to remember the user’s preference for 
a longer duration will not be exempted of consent.  
Load Balancing – The 29WP says that load balancing 
is a technique that allows distributing the processing 
of web server requests over a pool of machines instead 
of just one. Among several techniques, a cookie may 
be used to identify the server in the pool in order for 
the load balancer to redirect the requests 
appropriately. These are session cookies. 
 
Session Multimedia Content Player – The 29WP 
clarifies that these apply to any multimedia content 
and BTT used to keep track of the state of audio/video. 
When the user visits a website containing related text 
and video contents, both of these contents are equally 
part of a service explicitly requested by the user and 
as such, these are exempted of consent. As there is no 
long-term need for this information, they should 
expire once the session ends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1. Shared responsibility between publishers and third parties 
As the Article 5(3) of the ePD covers any kind of information (regardless if it is personal data), it is 
applicable to any entity that stores or gains access to information already stored in the device of the 
user/subscriber, whether the latter is a data controller or data processor. If the main website content, fully 
controlled by the publisher, is setting cookies in his web domain (first party cookies), then the publisher 
will be primarily responsible for complying with the requirement to obtain valid consent. 
We question if only the website publishers are obliged to display information and collect consent. Web 
publishers are fully responsible for all processing of personal data triggered by any interaction with the user 
that is performed by the web service and must ensure compliance with the existing legislation: the ePD and 
the GDPR. This includes when third-party services are used as processors or when third-party services act 
as controllers. 
The recurrent scenario when multiple entities are involved in the installation of and access to a cookie is 
mentioned in the recent DPAs guidelines on cookies. In this segment of thought, the 29WP (WP171) 
contends that a website publisher that allows third parties to place cookies shares the responsibility for 
information and consent. The ICO42 takes the view that where the website publisher sets third-party cookies, 
this same controller and the third party are jointly responsible for ensuring that users are clearly informed 
about cookies and for obtaining valid consent. This means they are both determining the purpose and means 
of the processing of personal data of any user that visits the landing website.  In substance, it is considerably 
more difficult for a third party which has less direct control on the interface with the user to achieve this. 
The ICO further instructs the need to include a contractual obligation into agreements between web 
publishers and third-parties on the allocation of responsibility to provide information about the third-party 
cookies and to obtain consent. The CNIL43 observes that when only one organization is involved in the use 
of trackers (e.g. a publisher who uses cookies for his own statistical analysis), that organization is fully 
responsible for providing notice and obtaining consent from the users. In other cases, several parties may 
be involved in the user of trackers (e.g. a web publisher and an advertising agency). In such case, they may 
be considered as independent controllers, joint controllers, or data processors.  In all other cases, third 
                                               
42 cf ICO Guidance (n 19) 34-35. 
43 CNIL Guidelines (n 29) Art. 3. CNIL, ‘Cookies: CNIL extends its controls beyond site publishers’ (2016)  
<www.cnil.fr/fr/cookies-la-cnil-etend-ses-controles-au-dela-des-editeurs-de-sites> accessed 11 December 2019. 
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parties who use trackers are independent controllers, fully responsible for the trackers they use, which 
means that they must obtain consent directly from the users. 
Where the parties (controllers) determine jointly the purposes and means of the processing, they must enter 
into a joint controllership agreement in accordance with Article 26 of the GDPR, including which party 
provides notice and obtains consent from the users. 
Lastly, a data processor, in this context, is defined as an entity which installs information and/or has access 
to information stored on a user device exclusively on behalf of a data controller, without re-using the data 
collected via the tracker for the processor’s own purposes.  In such case, the parties must enter into a data 
processing agreement. 
3.4. Exclusions from this work 
Although the ePD stipulates the need for consent for the storage of or access to cookies, the practical 
implementations of the legal requirements vary among website operators across EU Member States. 
Accordingly, different DPAs have different opinions because the ePD got implemented differently in EU 
countries’ national law. Hopefully, the upcoming ePrivacy Regulation will provide a unified 
implementation for all the member states. In this work, we are not going to study the differences of the ePD 
implementation in each member state, but instead study the GDPR requirements on valid consent.  
We did not contemplate deliberately linguistic-dependent issues mostly related to information and 
accessibility-based requirements of section 4.4. Such analysis needs a language/social scientist expert 
knowledge.  
We have excluded the requirement of explicit consent which is required whenever websites deal with: i) 
special categories of data (listed in Article 9 of the GDPR); ii) data transfers to third countries; and iii) 
automated decision-making (including profiling). As this requirement should contain a double-layer 
verification approach − following the recommendation by the 29WP (since ticking one box or pressing one 
button is not enough to ensure an affirmative and explicit act) − we decided not to contemplate this added 
layer verification effort.  
In the analysis of the element of a freely given consent, we did not consider the cases of unbalance of power 
(Recital 43 of the GDPR) for the same motive as above. This is mostly observed in the context of a public 
authority, employer, medical service relationship, or wherever there is a dominant position in relation to 
the data subject. In such contexts, the data subject fearing adverse consequences has no realistic alternative 
to accept the processing terms.  
While considering the information necessary for an informed consent (section 4.4), we excluded the 
analysis of the purposes of an informed consent, meaning that we don’t analyze the text inside the purposes 
presented in the cookie banners. We state that in the information page, each purpose should be sufficiently 
unambiguous and clearly expressed, specific and clear. For the same reason as explained above, these sub-
requirements are language-dependent and therefore not covered in this work. 
This paper does not analyze consent expressed through browser settings. We think that browser settings, as 
they exist today, do not correspond to the requirements of a valid consent for the following reasons: i. no 
purposes are specified; they do not reflect an informed decision; and iii. they also do not express an 
unambiguous consent. The 29WP44 mentions that browser settings may be considered as mechanism for 
expressing consent if it is clearly presented to the user. We do not agree with this statement for the reason 
that many browser vendors expose cookie settings in browser preferences that are hard to find. Moreover, 
the location and user interface of such cookie settings changes significantly from one version of the browser 
to another. Even though cookie settings work in some browsers, this does not generally apply to all tracking 
technologies. For example, since there is no precise way to detect browser fingerprinting, browser 
preferences are not a meaningful control mechanism for this tracking technology (and when browsers 
provide some settings for fingerprinting, such settings rely on blacklists and similar heuristics, thus not 
protecting user completely). Due to the complexities of this topic, we have excluded it from this paper.  
We also do not address the specific concerns related to children’s consent. We left out for our study 
exceptions specified in the GDPR, e.g. research in cases of medical research conducted in the public interest 
or for compliance with legal obligations (Recital 51).  
                                               
44 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies’ (WP 
208, 2 October 2013) 4 (henceforth named 29WP 208). 
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4. Requirements for valid consent for cookie banners 
This section presents our interdisciplinary legal and technical analysis of the requirements applied to cookie 
banner design. Since there is no definition of consent given in the ePrivacy Directive, we follow the GDPR 
definition of consent. The GDPR constructs an onerous and prescriptive criterion for the valid acquisition 
of consent. We include the four cumulative validity elements given by Article 4(11) of the GDPR which 
amount to: freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous. Besides these mentioned elements, we make 
salient three other requirements: prior, readable and accessible. Even if these elements are mentioned in the 
legislation, they are not part of the definition of Article 4(11). We claim that these three additional 
requirements are meaningful to be considered for their practical effects in the online environment of cookie 
banners. Table 2 depicts the seven high-level requirements and their respective provenance.  
Table 2 High-level requirements for a valid consent 
Provenance High-level requirements 
Article 4(11) of 
the GDPR 
Freely given 
Specific 
Informed  
Unambiguous  
Added from 
our analysis 
Prior 
Readable and accessible 
Revocable 
For the analysis of each requirement, we propose the ensuing content structure: presentation of the 
requirements, examples of cookie banners, and the procedure for compliance verification. This structure is 
shown in Table 3.  
Requirements. We present the seven high-level requirements, followed by the definition of the fine-
grained low-level requirements. We convey the respective legal sources upon which each requirement is 
based. The sources are either grounded in  
 
• Binding legal source (legislation and/or case-law); 
• Expert guidance issued by the 29WP and/or DPAs; and 
• Our interpretation.  
We show for each requirement the correspondent violation. This information is presented in a ‘requirement 
box’ (in a consolidated form, for ease of reading). 
Examples. We provide examples of compliant cookie banners and also cookie banners that violate a given 
requirement. Each example is extracted from real-world websites, illustrated in figures duly dated.   
Procedure to verify compliance. We describe the procedure that needs to be put in place in order to detect 
violations for each requirement. Such procedure can be assessed in three ways:  
 
• Manual, relying only on a human operator; 
• Technical, an expert using computer tools able to detect a violation; or a  
• Mix of manual and technical means. 
Table 3 Requirements for a valid consent on cookie banner design, assessment and source 
Requirements Assessment Source Location in 
the paper 
High-Level 
Requirements 
Sub-Level 
Requirements 
Manual (M) 
and/or 
Technical (T) 
 
Legal 
Source 
based 
EDBP 
and/or 
DPA based 
Our 
interpretation 
Prior Prior to setting 
cookies 
M and T ✔ ✔ 
 
4.1.1 
Prior to sending 
cookies 
M and T 
 
 ✔ 4.1.2 
Free No merging into a 
contract 
M ✔ ✔ 
 
4.2.1 
No tracking walls M ✔ ✔ ✔  4.2.2 
Specific Separate consent  
per purpose 
M ✔ ✔ 
 
4.3.1 
Informed Accessibility of 
information page 
M ✔ ✔ ✔ 4.4.1 
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Information on 
cookies 
M and T ✔ ✔ 
 
4.4.2 
Information about 
the cookie 
configurations  
M ✔  ✔ 4.4.3 
Information about 
the data controller 
M ✔ ✔ 
 
4.4.4 
Information about 
the data subject 
rights 
M ✔  
 
4.4.5 
Unambiguous Affirmative  
Action Design 
M and T ✔ ✔ 
 
4.5.1 
Configurable 
banner 
M ✔  ✔ 4.5.2 
Post- consent 
registration 
M and T 
 
 ✔ 4.5.3 
Correct consent 
registration 
M and T   ✔ 4.5.4 
Readable and 
accessible 
No consent wall M   ✔ 4.6.2 
Revocable Possible to change 
in the future 
M ✔ ✔ ✔ 4.7.1 
Delete ‘consent 
cookie’ and 
communicate to 
third parties 
M and T 
 
 ✔ 4.7.2 
 
4.1. Prior consent 
Before storing information or gaining access to information on a user's terminal, website publishers need 
to request prior consent to data subjects in order to guarantee that the user has some control over the 
processing of their information.45 Even if no explicit provision was made manifest both in the GDPR and 
the ePD, the timing ‘prior’ is confirmed through the combined analysis of both legislative instruments.  
Under the GDPR aegis, the 29WP (WP259 rev.01)46 claims that ‘prior consent’ can be derived from Article 
6 by the wording ‘has given’, 
Although the GDPR does not literally prescribe in Article 4(11) that consent must be given prior 
to the processing activity, this is clearly implied. The heading of Article 6(1) and the wording 
‘has given’ in Article 6(1)(a) supports this interpretation. It follows logically from Article 6 and 
Recital 40 that a valid lawful basis must be present before starting a data processing.  
From the ePD stance, such understanding of a ‘prior consent’ is derived from Article 5(3) of the ePD, 
according to the 29WP guidance,47-48 
Article 5(3) contains a specific rule regarding the storing of information or gaining of access to 
information on a user's terminal, including for the purpose of tracking the user's on-line activities. 
While Article 5(3) does not use the word prior, this is a clear and obvious conclusion from the 
wording of the provision. (…) It makes good sense for consent to be obtained prior to the starting 
of the data processing. 
                                               
45 The CNIL recalls that many site publishers have reported difficulties in obtaining prior consent from Internet users 
before depositing and reading cookies for two main reasons: 1. this would prevent the display of certain advertisements, 
resulting in a significant loss of income; 2. cookies do not come from  their own servers, being linked to the activity of 
third-party partners, over which they have no control. As a result, publishers alone cannot bear full responsibility for 
enforcing tracer rules as ‘third-party cookies’ because they originate from third-party companies, cf. CNIL, ‘Cookies: 
CNIL extends its controls beyond site publishers’ (n 41).   
46 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 17. 
47 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (WP187, 13 July 2011).  
48 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Working Document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies’ (WP 
208, 2 October 2013) 4. 
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In the light of the above, a consent request needs to be presented before TBB are deployed. Seconding this 
rule, the 29WP (WP208)49 asserts that ‘consent should be sought before cookies are set or read. As a result, 
a website should deliver a consent solution in which no cookies are set to user’s device (other than those 
that may not require user’s consent) before that user has signaled their wishes regarding such cookies’. 
Moreover, processing is unlawful if carried out before the request for consent due to the lack of legal 
ground, as denoted by the 29WP (WP147),50 
Otherwise, the processing carried out during the period of time from the moment the processing 
had started until the moment that consent had been obtained would be unlawful because of lack 
of legal ground. Furthermore, in such cases, if the individual decided against consenting, any 
data processing that had already taken place would be unlawful for that reason as well.  
We have subdivided the requirement of ‘prior consent’ into two sub-requirements: firstly, consent must be 
obtained before TBB are set or stored (those requiring consent) (section 4.1.1); secondly, consent must be 
obtained before TBB are sent, i.e. before the content of the webpage that is associated to such cookies is 
loaded (section 4.1.2). 
4.1.1. Prior to setting cookies  
It follows from the foregoing that consent must be collected before TBB are set in the user´s device (other 
than those that may not require user’s consent).  
 
Requirement Prior to setting cookies 
Consent must be obtained before cookies are set 
Violation Cookies are set before consent is given 
Examples. Figures 1 and 2 depict the case of violation of the requirement ‘Prior to setting cookies’. While 
accessing the eBay webpage, a banner appears affirming that by using the website, the user accepts the use 
of cookies to enhance their services. This overlay includes a link to ‘learn more’. This consent mechanism 
doesn’t allow a user to make a choice before cookies are deployed, even where the controls are located in 
a ‘more information’ section. Before the user gives any consent, an advertising cookie that requires consent 
(IDE, by doubleclick.net) was stored in the user device.  
 
Figure 1 Access to the eBay website (<www.ebay.com/> accessed 27 July 2019) 
 
                                               
49 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 4. 
50 cf 29WP (WP147) (n 45) 31. 
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Figure 2 Violation of the requirement ‘Prior to setting cookies’ by eBay website (<www.ebay.com> 
 accessed 27 July 2019) 
How to detect violations? One could detect a violation of the ‘Prior to setting cookies’ requirement by 
visiting a website with no cookies in the browser and analyzing the cookies that are set upon visiting the 
website (as shown in Figure 2). Such verification, however, contains two complex tasks. First, one would 
require more specific browser tools to detect such violations when other browser storage mechanisms are 
used, like Web caching mechanisms. It’s possible to detect the setting of cookies by a technical expert with 
the corresponding browser tools or fully automatically. Second, the purpose of each cookie (or other stored 
information) needs to be declared and known in order to determine whether consent is required. This is not 
possible to detect automatically or with technical tools. Even manually, it is not possible to estimate whether 
a cookie requires consent or not by reading its purpose in the cookie policy. Also, the purposes of cookies 
(seldom) described in cookie policies are often not clear, too vague or incomplete.  For instance, the privacy 
policy on the pubmatic.com website indicates that the ‘repi’ cookie is ‘a short-lived cookie that is used to 
determine if repixeling is in progress’. This description is obscure and makes it difficult to qualify the 
purpose of this cookie. Another example is ‘centerVisitorId’ on the learnworlds.com website, whose only 
description states: ‘used by site’s popups and download forms’. For automatic verification, we would need 
a self-declaration of the purpose of each cookie in a standard format.  
4.1.2. Prior to sending cookies  
Consent must be obtained before cookies are sent, because cookies are sent automatically when the third-
party content is loaded (hence, cookies are ‘read’). 
 
Requirement Prior to sending cookies   
Consent must be obtained before cookies are sent (therefore, before the content that sends such 
cookies is loaded) 
Violation Cookies sent (content loaded) before consent is obtained 
We note that respecting such a requirement demands important adaptation of current technical tools. 
Browsers automatically attach cookies to requests, which makes it complicated for cookie banners 
implementation to prevent cookie transmission prior to consent. 
Examples. Figures 3 and 4 show how google.com sets cookies in the user’s browser. Notice that 
google.com is a default search engine in most of the browsers, hence such experience is common to many 
users. Google.com is setting a cookie ‘NID’ prior to the user’s consent – this cookie now belongs to 
google.com (see Figure 4). After visiting google.com, a user goes to a different website that contains some 
content from google.com. Figure 5 shows an example website <www.w3schools.com>, commonly used by 
Web developers. While accessing this website (with Firefox 69.0.1 in our experiments), no banner is shown 
to the user, however requests are sent to cse.google.com in order to fetch Google Customized Search Engine 
that helps the user to search inside this website.  Figure 6 shows a violation of the ‘Prior to sending cookies’ 
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requirement because NID cookie (see ➊) is now sent to cse.google.com (➋) without user’s consent while 
fetching some (supposedly functional) content from cse.google.com (➌).  
 
 
Figure 3 Access to the Google.com website (<https://google.com> accessed 24 September 2019) 
 
Figure 4 Access to the Google.com website: advertising cookie NID is stored in the browser (<https://google.com> 
accessed 24 September 2019) 
 
Figure 5 Access to the W3Schools.com website (www.w3schools.com> accessed 24 September 2019) 
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Figure 6 Violation of the requirement ‘Prior to sending cookies’ by W3Schools.com website 
(<www.w3schools.com>, accessed 24 September 2019) 
How to detect violations? Detecting violations of this requirement is complex even when it comes to detect 
simple HTTP cookies. One would need to test the website with the corresponding cookies already set in 
the browser and analyze all the content loading in order to detect which content is sending such cookies. 
This procedure might sound easy when cookies are simply attached by the browser when the content is 
loading. However, Papadopoulos et al. have shown that when cookies are sent, they are often encrypted or 
obfuscated. Therefore, detecting when exactly they are being sent is extremely hard.51 Moreover, even more 
complex techniques are needed to detect sending of identifiers stored in other browser storages than 
cookies. We need to use taint-tracking technologies to monitor when cookies are read and further sent to 
other third parties. Browser fingerprinting also falls into this requirement: no information is explicitly stored 
in the user’s browser; however, a unique identifier build from a browser fingerprint is sent. It is well-known 
in the computer science research community that detection of fingerprinting is a complex challenge and as 
of today, there is no technique to detect browser fingerprinting accurately.52 Companies using browser 
fingerprinting need to declare a purpose of its usage because fingerprinting can be used for tracking 
(requires consent), and for security (exempted from consent). 
4.2. Free 
Consent must be freely given, as prescribed in the GDPR in Article 4(11) and further specified in Article 
7(4). The request for consent should imply a voluntary choice to accept or decline the processing of personal 
data, taken in the absence of any kind of pressure or compulsion53 on the user in persuading to give his 
consent. The same holds for processing personal data through cookies. The 29WP (WP208)54 refers to this 
freedom of choice of the users in choosing their cookie settings. It asserts that ‘the user should have an 
opportunity to freely choose between the option to accept some or all cookies or to decline all or some 
cookies and to retain the possibility to change the cookie settings in the future.’ 
As a consequence of not having a freely given consent, the request becomes invalid, as cautioned by the 
WP29 (WP187), ‘any pressure or inappropriate influence exerted on the person (in different ways) 
preventing them from exercising their will shall invalidate consent’, and ‘cannot be claimed to be a 
legitimate ground to justify the processing’. 
                                               
51Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Nicolas Kourtellis, and Evangelos Markatos, ‘Cookie Synchronization: Everything You 
Always Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask’ (In The World Wide Web Conference, Ling Liu and Ryen White 
(Eds.). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2019) 1432-1442.  
52 cf Laperdrix (n 11). 
53The 29WP opinions provide examples of a non-freely given consent can reveal different conducts: compulsion, 
pressure or inability to exercise free will; being put under pressure, be it social, financial, psychological or other; 
deception; intimidation; inappropriate influence; coercion; significant negative consequences if he does not consent 
(e.g. substantial extra costs), 29WP (WP187,  and WP259 rev.01).  
54 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 5. 
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Forced consent is decomposed in the 29WP guidelines considering three elements: imbalance of power,55 
unconditional and non-detrimental. In this paper, we only analyze both the unconditional (in section 4.2.1) 
and the non-detrimental elements (in section 4.2.2). Imbalance of power is a subjective requirement that 
can be only evaluated in a case-per-case manner and is dependent on a specific context when consent is 
given, hence we excluded this analysis as explained in section 3.4.  
4.2.1. Unconditionality related to a contract  
Article 7(4) and Recital 43 of the GDPR confers a presumption of a not freely given consent in the presence 
of a contract or service. Article 7(4) reads as: ‘When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost 
account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a 
service, is conditional on consent’. Recital 43 recites as ‘consent is presumed not to be freely given (…) if 
the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such 
consent not being necessary for such performance’.  
The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that services are not offered upon the condition that users give 
their personal information, data which are not necessary for the offering of these services. Article 7(4) 
prohibits any form of bundling of a service with a request for consent, when the consent is not necessary 
for the delivery of that service. Making online transactions (together with marketing purposes) dependent 
on the user consent for processing personal data that is not necessary for these purposes, can be reasonably 
assumed that consent is forced. As a result of the established presumption, any controller has to prove that 
consent was freely given. 
In practice, this requires consent for processing to be clearly distinguishable (untied, unbundled) from 
contracts or agreements,56 or privacy policies and terms of contract (as posited in Article 7(2) GDPR). 
Consent would be deprived of any meaning if services are only offered in exchange for mandatory consent 
to the exploitation of personal data. As the 29WP (WP159 rev.01)57 reasserts, the ‘GDPR ensures that the 
processing of personal data for which consent is sought cannot become directly or indirectly the counter-
performance of a contract’.  
From Article 7(4) we denote the words conditionality and inter alia (i.e. among others). It follows therefrom 
that the European legislator chose to explicitly list ‘conditionality’ as an instructive example of a non-freely 
given consent. In addition, the word ‘inter alia’ refers to other cases rather than the case of conditionality.  
Drawing on this guidance, we deduce the requirement that the consent request should not be merged into a 
contract or terms of service, as depicted in the requirement box. 
 
Requirement No merging into a contract 
A request for consent cannot be merged into a contract or service 
Violation When both consent and a contract (for which consent is not needed) are merged 
Example. Figure 7 represents a case of a bundled consent request where the website offers news service, 
provided by the Washington Post website, and requests consent of the user. 
                                               
55 Recital 43 of the GDPR clarifies situations in which consent cannot be seen as freely given ‘where there is a clear 
imbalance between the data subject and the controller (…) and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in 
all the circumstances of that specific situation.’ The Recital concerns authorities, but also corporations in a dominant 
market position (e.g. in the area of social networking service of relevance, as in the case of Facebook), and/or in a 
closed and proprietary network where the data subject is factually forced to join or maintain a profile with the controller, 
to be able to interact with persons that are not available on other services. A representative related complaint on forced 
consent was issued by NOYB against Facebook, See NOYB, ‘Complaint filed against Facebook Ireland Ltd.’ (2018) 
<https://noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/complaint-facebook.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
56 An illustrative example is the complaint filed by NOYB against Google that we transcribe for the practical relevance 
of this requirement ‘bundling happens when the controller requires the data subject to consent to the privacy policy and 
to the terms as a whole, which in fact cover all the ‘services’, that the controller offers e.g. YouTube, Chrome Browser, 
Google Services, Google Maps, Google Search, Google News, Gmail, AdWords, as well as several other services’, 
NOYB, ‘Complaint filed against Google LL’ (2018) <https://noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/complaint-
android.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
57 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 8. 
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Figure 7 Violation of the requirement ‘No merging into a contract’ by Washington Post website (homepage 
<www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3161abcd072b> accessed 17 May 2019) 
How to detect violations? Detection of such violation can only be made manually because it requires 
humans to read the text in the cookie banner, understand its meaning, and conclude that by pressing ‘I 
agree’ button, he gives consent to the use of third-party cookies and agrees with the privacy policy and 
terms of service at the same time. Experimental techniques using machine learning or keywords could be 
tested, with the inherent lack of perfect accuracy of these methods. See, for instance, Libert's work58 on 
privacy policies using keywords, and Harkous et al. contribution59 using machine learning techniques. Such 
inaccurate methods would not be usable within judicial proceedings and would need to be verified 
manually.  
4.2.2. Non detrimental – the case of cookie walls 
A freely given consent implies also the consent request to be non-detrimental. Detrimental consent refers 
to the case where the data subject is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment, which means, 
facing significant negative consequences (Recital 42 of the GDPR). For the purposes of this paper, 
detrimental practices occur is different situations, suchlike: 
• When users, even before expressing any choice, face a cookie wall blocking access to an online 
service’s content (e.g. stating ‘to access our site you must agree to our use cookies’); 
• When users, after refusing tracking cookies, have denied access to the webpage they want to 
consult, or the service is downgraded;60 
• Paid services or extra costs.61 
The first two listed practices refer to the appearance of a barrier page and are known by the designation of 
tracking wall, cookie wall, take-it-or-leave-it-choices approaches which means that users who do not accept 
tracking across other sites will be denied access to the websites they seek to access.62 However, users should 
have the possibility to refuse cookies and still be able to browse the page.63 
                                               
56 Timothy Libert, ‘An Automated Approach to Auditing Disclosure of Third-Party Data Collection in Website Privacy 
Policies’ (Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering 
Committee, Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, 2018) 207-216.  
59 Hamza Harkous, Kassem Fawaz, Rémi Lebret, Florian Schaub, Kang G. Shin, and Karl Aberer, ‘Polisis: automated 
analysis and presentation of privacy policies using deep learning’ (Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Conference on 
Security Symposium (SEC'18) USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2018) 531-548. 
60 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 11. 
61 Regarding extra costs, such an obligation could foster social/economic discrimination (i.e. the rich, who can pay to 
protect their privacy, and the poor, who cannot) which would run against the universal nature of the fundamental rights 
to privacy and data protection. Forcing websites to offer a paid subscription service could also interfere with the 
development of new innovative business models which might be advantageous to consumers. 
62 cf EDPS Opinion (n 21) 17. 
63 Ronald Leenes, ‘The Cookiewars: From regulatory failure to user empowerment?’ (M. van Lieshout, & J-H. 
Hoepman (Eds.), The Privacy & Identity Lab: 4 years later, 3, The Privacy & Identity Lab, Nijmegen (2015) 31-49. 
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As mentioned in section 3.3, if certain cookies are not necessary for the services requested and only provide 
for additional benefits of the website operator, the user should be in a position to refuse them (29WP 208).64 
The ePrivacy Directive refers to the ‘conditional access to website content’ in Recital 25. It states: ‘access 
to specific website content may be made conditional on the well-informed acceptance of a cookie or similar 
device, if it is used for a legitimate purpose’. A literal interpretation of this excerpt apparently legitimizes 
conditional access to a website and this literal reading is sometimes used to justify the use a cookie wall.65-
66 Notably, this interpretation derives from an incorrect analysis of this Recital, for it makes access to a 
website conditional on the acceptance of cookies,67 and such conditionality renders a non-freely given 
consent. In this regard, the 29WP (WP126)68 recommends clarification or review of this Recital. More 
recently, the 29WP69 makes explicit that ‘in order for consent to be freely given, access to services and 
functionalities must not be made conditional on the consent of a user to the processing of information 
related to or processed by the terminal equipment of end-users, meaning that cookie walls should be 
explicitly prohibited’. In the 29WP (WP 240) understanding, these take it or leave it approaches rarely70 
meet the requirements for freely given consent. It specifically stated that ‘if the consequences of consenting 
undermine individuals' freedom of choice, consent would not be free. The Working Party invites the EC to 
develop a specific prohibition on such 'take it or leave it' choices with regard to electronic communications, 
where such choices would undermine the principle of freely given consent.’ 
The resulting analysis, also consolidated by the positioning of the majority of the stakeholders shown in the 
next section 4.2.3., sustains that websites need to give access to content when a user does not consent to 
BTT beyond strictly necessary to provide the service, and hence, consent request should not present a 
tracking wall.  
 
Requirement No tracking walls 
Blocking access to a website unless the user gives a positive consent, is not a valid consent. 
Violation Existence of a tracking wall for cookies that require consent. 
Examples. Figure 8 shows an example of a cookie wall on the MedicalNewsToday website. When the page 
first loads, the website prevents a visitor from viewing any other page unless the user clicks the Accept and 
continue to site button displayed. Figure 9 shows the resulting page after the user clicked on the Deny 
permission link: the website only provides access to 10 articles, preselected by the website (and not articles 
requested by the user). The banner above reminds the user that he has a limited access to the website because 
he disallowed cookies and proposes to update the privacy settings. 
                                               
64 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 6. 
65 cf. Kosta (n 20) 1. 
66 Frederik Borgesius, Sanne Kruikemeier, Sophie Boerman and Natali Helberge, ‘Tracking Walls, Take-It-Or-Leave-
It Choices, the GDPR, and the EPrivacy Regulation’ (2017) European Data Protection Law Review, Volume 3, Issue 
3, 353-368. 
67 cf. Leenes (n 61). 
68 The 29WP states that ‘the last paragraph of Recital 25, stipulating that access to specific website content may be 
made conditional on the acceptance of a cookie, might be contradictory with the position that the users should have the 
possibility to refuse the storage of a cookie on their personal computers and therefore may need clarification or 
revision’, Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2006 on the review of the regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications and Services, with focus on the ePrivacy Directive’ (WP 126, 26 September 2006) 3.  
69 Statement of the EDPB on the revision of the ePrivacy Regulation and its impact on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the privacy and confidentiality of their communications, 
<https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_on_eprivacy_en.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
70 The 29WP identifies five circumstances in which forced consent should be specifically prohibited, namely: 1. 
Tracking on websites, apps and or locations that reveal information about special categories of data. 2. Tracking by 
unidentified third parties for unspecified purposes. 3. All government funded services; 4. All circumstances identified 
in the GDPR that lead to invalid consent; 5. Bundled consent for processing for multiple purposes. Finally, the 29WP 
alerts to the position of news media, since they seem to be the heaviest users of tracking cookies and cookie walls, cf 
29WP (WP240) (n 24) 17. 
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Figure 8 Violation of the requirement ‘No tracking wall’ by the MedicalNewsToday website 
(<www.medicalnewstoday.com/> accessed  25 September 2019) 
 
Figure 9 Result of denying consent on MedicalNewsToday website (<www.medicalnewstoday.com/> accessed 25 
September 2019) 
How to detect violations? Detection of such a violation is possible manually. The user needs to understand 
whether a website allows the user to access the website without expressing consent and whether there is an 
option to refuse consent. We also consider a violation of this requirement when refusing consent leads to a 
restrictive access to the service, like in the example of MedicalNewsToday website. 
4.2.3. Stakeholders positioning on tracking/cookie walls  
There is some inconsistency in the positions taken by EU DPAs and other stakeholders on whether a 
tracking/cookie wall consists in a violation of a valid consent.  
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The European Data Protection Supervisor,71 the European Parliament,72 and the Bureau Européen des 
Unions de Consommateurs73 (BEUC) are of the opinion that tracking walls and any other type of 
detrimental rendering of consent should be forbidden, as the GDPR mandates. Noyb.eu74 filed four 
complaints over forced consent against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook. The French, Dutch, 
and Belgian DPAs share the same positioning as the 29WP. 
The ICO75 in its recent guidance states that consent which is forced via a cookie wall is ‘unlikely to be 
valid’. However, it also notes that GDPR must be balanced against other rights, including freedom of 
expression and freedom to conduct a business. The ICO seems to adopt a wait and see approach, as it argues 
that  
In some circumstances, this approach is inappropriate; for example, where the user or subscriber 
has no genuine choice but to sign up. (…) If your use of a cookie wall is intended to require, or 
influence, users to agree to their personal data being used by you or any third parties as a 
condition of accessing your service, then it is unlikely that user consent is considered valid. 
The Dutch DPA76 published on its website in December 2019 its viewpoint that websites must remain 
accessible when refusing tracking cookies and that cookie walls are not permitted under the GDPR. It adds 
that with a cookie wall, websites, apps or other services cannot receive valid permission from their visitors 
or users. The regulator explains that the inspected websites are involved in an ongoing investigation into 
cookie walls. Alongside, the Minister for Legal Protection77 of the Netherlands adverts that when a website 
is visited, the visitor not be denied access to the content of the website if he does not agree with the 
placement of the cookies (cookie wall). Only functional cookies and non-privacy sensitive cookies do not 
need permission. It states further that the government is arguing in the European Council for a ban on cookie 
walls in the new e-privacy regulation.  
In the same light, the Belgian DPA issued its own guidance78 stating that blocking a user’s access to a 
website, on the basis that the user had not consented to cookies, was not a compliant solution. The German 
DPA79 on its own guidance Guidelines for Telemedia Providers contends that a visit to a website should still 
be possible if data subjects decide against the setting of cookies. The same reasoning is upheld by the Danish DPA in 
its report on consent.80 
Conversely, the Austrian DPA81 issued a decision on 30 November 2018, pronouncing that consent was 
freely given via a cookie wall in the case of an Austrian newspaper, ‘Der Standard’, that gave users the 
option to either: i) accept cookies and receive full access to the website; ii) refuse cookies and receive a 
limited access to the website; or iii) pay a fee for a monthly subscription without accepting cookies. The 
                                               
71 cf EDPS Opinion (n 21) 17. 
72 In the Proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation of the European Parliament, it is proposed that ‘the Regulation should 
prevent the use of so- called “cookie walls” and “cookie banners” that do not help users to maintain control over their 
personal information and privacy or become informed about their rights’, Draft European Parliament Legislative 
Resolution <www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0324_EN.html?redirect> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
73BEUC Position Paper, ‘Proposal For A Regulation On Privacy And Electronic Communications (E-Privacy)’ 
(2017)<www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2017-
059_proposal_for_a_regulation_on_privacy_and_electronic_communications_e-privacy.pdf> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
74 NOYB, ‘GDPR: noyb.eu filed four complaints over “forced consent” against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp and 
Facebook’ (2018) <https://noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/pa_forcedconsent_en.pdf> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
75 cf ICO Guidance (n 19) 31. 
76 cf Dutch DPA ‘Cookies’ (n 35); and ‘Many websites incorrectly request permission to place tracking cookies’ (2019) 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/ap-veel-websites-vragen-op-onjuiste-wijze-toestemming-voor-
plaatsen-tracking-cookies> accessed 11 December 2019. 
77 House of Representatives of the Netherlands, ‘Answer to questions from members Middendorp and Van Gent about  
a possible cookie wall ban’ (2019) 
 <www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2019D49667&did=2019D49667> accessed 11 
December 2019. 
78 Belgian DPA, ‘Cookies’ <www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/faq-themas/cookies> accessed 11 December 2019. 
79 cf German DPA Guidelines (n 25). 
80 Danish DPA, ‘Guide on consent’ (2019) <www.datatilsynet.dk/media/6562/samtykke.pdf> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
81Austrian DPA decision on the validity of consent (2018) 
<www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Dsk/DSBT_20181130_DSB_D122_931_0003_DSB_2018_00/DSBT_20181130_D
SB_D122_931_0003_DSB_2018_00.pdf > accessed 11 December 2019. 
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authority indicated that cookie walls are not prohibited because the newspaper’s own settings provide a 
degree of choice. First, Der Standard only places cookies after the user makes an informed decision to 
allow the placement of cookies. Second, the individual can withhold consent by either entering into a paid 
subscription or leaving Der Standard’s website. Thirdly, the DPA considered Der Standard’s prices to be 
‘not unreasonably high.’ In fact, giving consent to cookies results in a positive outcome for the individual, 
because they gain unlimited access to the newspaper’s articles. The Austrian DPA did not, however, discuss 
what would happen if an individual withdrew their consent to the usage of cookies.  
The Spanish DPA82 acknowledges limiting access to a website where consent to the use of cookies has not 
been granted (where information duties were duly complied with). We consider that these guidelines allow 
websites to block access if the user rejects cookies, hence implementing tracking walls.  
There may be certain cases in which the non-acceptance of the use of cookies prevents the total 
or partial use of the service, provided that the user is properly informed about it. However, access 
to the service cannot be denied in case of rejection of cookies, in those cases in which such denial 
prevents the exercise of a right legally recognized to the user, since access to said website is the 
only means provided to the user to exercise such right.83  
Borgesius et al., in their commissioned study84 on the Proposal for the ePrivacy Regulation, mentioned a 
circumstance catalogue composed of a non-exhaustive black list of circumstances in which tracking walls 
are banned (list of illegal practices), supplemented with a grey list (practices presumed to be illegal). The 
study refers that if a situation is on the grey list, there is a legal presumption that a tracking wall makes 
consent involuntary, and therefore invalid. Hence, the legal presumption of the grey list shifts the burden 
of proof, e.g. for situations on the grey list, it’s up to the company deploying the cookie wall to prove that 
users gave a free consent, even though the company installed a tracking wall. We are instead of the opinion 
of a complete ban to cookie walls. 
Further developments need to be consolidated through case law from the European Court of Justice. In 
addition, businesses using tracking/cookie walls to obtain consent may want to consider preemptively 
streamlining their method for obtaining consent (e.g., by switching to a cookie banner that allows to refuse 
consent). Table 4 summarizes the different positioning made public from some stakeholders. 
Table 4 Positioning of stakeholders on cookie walls 
Stakeholders 
 
Cookie Wall as a 
violation of valid consent 
29WP ✔ 
EDPS ✔ 
BEUC ✔ 
European Parliament ✔ 
Dutch DPA ✔ 
UK DPA - ICO (not clear) 
Austrian DPA x 
French DPA - CNIL ✔ 
German DPA ✔ 
Spanish DPA (not clear) 
Danish DPA ✔ 
The Recital 21 of the current draft of the ePrivacy Regulation Proposal85 addresses indirectly the case of 
legitimizing cookie walls for advertising purposes. This indirect indication reveals that it is a topic of 
political controversy between the stakeholders. These draft signals that consent is valid (freely given) when 
the processing related to a service the user requested has advertising purposes. The Recital reads, 
                                               
82 Spanish DPA ‘Guide on the use of cookies’ (2019) <www.aepd.es/media/guias/guia-cookies.pdf> accessed 11 
December 2019 (author’s translation of the Spanish version) (henceforth named ‘Spanish DPA Guide’).  
83 Author’s translation of the Spanish version.  
84 Frederik Borgesius, Joris van Hoboken, Ronan P. Fahy, Kristina Irion, Max Rozendaal, ‘An Assessment of the 
Commission's Proposal on Privacy and Electronic Communications’ (Study for the LIBE Committee. Brussels: 
European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, Chapter 3.5.5, 2017) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)583152> accessed 11 December 
2019. 
85 cf Council of the European Union proposal (n 27).  
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[I]n some cases the use of cookies may also be necessary for providing a service, requested by 
the end-user, such as services provided to safeguard freedom of expression and information 
including for journalistic purposes, such as online newspaper or other press publications (…),  
that is wholly or mainly financed by advertising provided that, in addition, the end-user has been 
provided with clear, precise and user-friendly information about the purposes of cookies or 
similar techniques and has accepted such use.  
4.3. Specific  
Specific consent involves granularity of the consent request in order to avoid a catch-all purpose acceptance. 
In the following subsections we decomposed further this requirement. 
4.3.1. Separate consent per purpose 
The request for consent should be granular in the options for consenting to cookies, so that the user is able 
to give consent for an independent and specific purpose (29WP WP208). 86 This reasoning is given by the 
following recitals of the GDPR. Recital 43 clarifies the need for a separate consent for different processing 
operations. Recital 32 of the GDPR states that consent should be given per purpose (or set of purposes). 
The provision is worded as follows: ‘consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same 
purpose or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of them’. 
This element of a specific consent relates to the purpose limitation’ principle observed in Article 5(1)(b) of 
the GDPR. Therein rely two elements: i) data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes only; and ii) data must not be further processed in a way that is incompatible with those purposes. 
The Article reads: ‘personal data shall be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes […] (“purpose limitation’’)’. 
In this same line, the 29WP (WP 203)87 analysis this principle of ‘purpose limitation’ and explains that any 
purpose must be specified, which means, be precisely and fully identified. The 29WP (WP259 rev.01)88 
additionally comments on the needed consent for each purpose to comply with the conditions of a valid 
consent: 
‘Data subjects should be free to choose which purpose they accept, rather than having to consent 
to a bundle of processing purposes. (…) If the controller has conflated several purposes for 
processing and has not attempted to seek separate consent for each purpose, there is a lack of 
freedom. This granularity is closely related to the need of consent to be specific. (...) When data 
processing is done in pursuit of several purposes, the solution to comply with the conditions for 
valid consent lies in granularity, i.e. the separation of these purposes and obtaining consent for 
each purpose’. 
The 29WP (WP259 rev.01) instructs further that ‘a controller that seeks consent for various different purposes 
should provide a separate opt-in for each purpose, to allow users to give specific consent for specific 
purposes’. 
Planet49 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU89 determined that specific consent means that ‘it must 
relate specifically to the processing of the data in question and cannot be inferred from an indication of the 
data subject’s wishes for other purposes’. This means that consent should be granularly for each purpose 
of processing. 
The resulting analysis sustains that the banner should present each purpose separately (but also, it should 
allow accepting or rejecting each purpose separately), as depicted in the requirement box. 
 
Requirement Separate consent per purpose  
A consent should be separately requested for each purpose. 
Violation General consent request under conflated purposes 
                                               
86 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 3. 
87 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’ (WP 203, 2 April 2013). 
88 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 11. 
89 Case C-673/17 Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband v. Planet49, [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:801, para 58 (henceforth 
named Planet49 case).  
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Examples. Figure 10 shows a website of wordreference.com, where a user cannot give consent per purpose, 
but instead is presented with a ‘Learn More & Set Preferences’ link that only allows to give consent per 
third-party. Figure 11 shows (a part of) the list of vendors, which is longer than several screens and is 
obviously overwhelming and not usable for an average user. Figure 12 outlines the Dailymail website 
banner, which conflates together different data processing purposes (e.g. personalization, ad selection, 
content selection and measurement) under a single acceptance request, therefore violates the requirement 
that consent should be given per purpose. On the other hand, Figure13 depicts a compliant design banner 
from the website senscritique.com. 
Figure 10 A settings accessible from the cookie banner on website of wordreference.com 
(<www.wordreference.com/enfr/sf> accessed  24 September 2019) 
 
Figure 11 The cookie banner of wordreference.com does not allow to refuse consent for all third-parties at once, only 
on a ‘per third party’ basis. (<www.wordreference.com/enfr/sf> accessed 24 September 2019) 
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Figure 12 Non-compliance with the requirement ‘separate consent per purpose’ 
(<www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html> accessed  17 May 2019) 
 
Figure 13 Compliance with the requirement ‘separate consent per purpose’ (<www.senscritique.com/> accessed  18 
May 2019) 
How to detect violations? A human operator can observe violations with no technical support. However, 
it would be possible to detect such violations if the user interface of cookie banner was standardized, which 
is not the case nowadays. 
4.3.2. Consent not required per cookie, per publisher, per third party 
Under the following three subheadings we add the observation that a request for consent per purpose does 
not include a request: per cookie; per publisher; nor per third-party, for the reasons explained below.  
• Not per cookie. We argue that the requirement of granular purposes does not mandate that the 
consent request should be provided on cookie basis. We claim that the consent request for each 
cookie is not user friendly and it might be too overwhelming for users. Moreover, few users are 
familiar with the concept of cookies and tracking technologies and therefore may lead to certain 
choices as a consequence of user’s lack of knowledge. We derive this conclusion from several 
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bases. The text of the Recital 25 of the ePD states that the cookie consent request covers its further 
uses, insofar as these uses are compatible with the initial purposes, for which the consent is 
provided. The 29WP (WP208)90 mentions that each website could prominently display a link to a 
location where all cookies used by the website are presented through types (and hence, not per 
cookie). In the same line, the ICO91 gives the same reasoning when referring to cookie categories,  
Some sites might use tens or even hundreds of cookies and therefore it may also be helpful to 
provide a broader explanation of the way cookies operate and the categories of cookies in use. 
For example, a description of the types of things you use analytics cookies for on the site will 
be more likely to satisfy the requirements than simply listing all the cookies you use with 
basic references to their function. 
The Danish DPA92 refers an example of a specific consent per purpose (and not per cookie),  
[A] website has a cookie pop-up in which the user can accept or decline cookies by purpose, 
i.e. the user can freely decide whether he or she wants functional, statistical and/or marketing 
cookies to be set by the website. The user can easily toggle cookies by purpose on and off. 
Then the website’s cookie consent is specific. 
• Not per publisher. The need of a separate and renewed consent per publisher is also discussable: if 
one publisher receives consent, it is questionable that it might share the consent with other 
publishers. In this regard, we refer to the case law of the European Court of Justice and adapt its 
reasoning to our consent-cookie request context. The Court (in its two decisions of Tele 2 and 
Deutsche Telekom93 in the context of electronic public directories), refers to the extension of the 
initial consent to the subsequent processing of the data by third-party companies, provided that 
such processing pursues that same purpose, and that the user was informed thereof. The Court 
hold that where a user consented to the passing of his personal data to a given company, the passing 
of the same data to another company, with the same purpose and without renewed consent from 
that user, does not violate the right to protection of personal data. The Court adds that a user will 
generally not have a selective opinion to object to the sharing of the same data through another, 
yet similar, provider. From these arguments, we conclude that there is no need for a separate and 
renewed consent per publisher whenever further processing follows that same purpose, and the 
user was informed thereof. In these cases, consent could be shared with other publishers. 
• Not per third-party. We believe it is not required a fine-grained customization per third parties. In 
fact, showing the full advertiser list, configures a deceptive design. The 29WP (WP259 rev.01)94 
suggests that the categories of third parties who receive personal data and wish to rely upon the 
original consent should be listed by category (or be individually named).  
It is possible to conclude that a consent request does not require the user’s consent for third-party 
cookies, but only aims to inform users of third-party cookie usage, or third party access to data 
collected by the cookies on the website: ‘necessary information would be the purpose(s) of the 
cookies and, if relevant, an indication of possible cookies from third parties or third party access 
to data collected by the cookies on the website’ 29WP (WP208).95 
The Italian DPA96 adopted the same reasoning and postulated that ‘publishers may not be required 
to include, on the home page of their websites, also the notices relating to the cookies installed by 
third parties via the publishers’ websites’. 
4.4. Informed Consent 
Whenever BTT are accessed or stored on a user’s device, the user must be given clear and comprehensive 
information on what is accessed or stored and on the purposes of this action. Besides, means for expressing 
their consent must be given, pursuant to Article 5(3) of the ePD. 
                                               
90 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 3 and 5. 
91 cf ICO Guidance (n 19) 10.  
92 cf Danish DPA (n 78).  
93C‑543/09  Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2011] EU:C:2011:279, para 62 to 65; and C-536/15 
Tele2 (Netherlands) BV and Others v Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:214. 
94 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 14.  
95  cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 3 and 5.  
96 Italian DPA, ‘Simplified Arrangements to Provide Information and Obtain Consent Regarding Cookies’ (2014) 
<www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/3167654> accessed 11 December 2019. 
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The type and accuracy of the information provided needs to be such as to put users in control of the data 
on their own device. The 29W (WP131)97 envisioned that the data subject’s consent is ‘based upon an 
appreciation and understanding of the facts and implications of an action’.  
The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU on the Planet49 case98 elucidated that providing ‘clear and 
comprehensive’ information means ‘that a user is in a position to be able to determine easily the 
consequences of any consent he might give and ensure that the consent given is well informed’. The 
information must be also ‘clearly comprehensible and sufficiently detailed so as to enable the user to 
comprehend the functioning of the cookies employed.’  
Regarding the timing to provide the information, the delivery of information should be concomitant to the 
time and place when consent is requested. As posited by the 29WP (WP208), information should be 
provided ‘at the time and place where consent is sought, for example, on the webpage where a user begins 
a browsing session (the entry page). As such, when accessing the website, users must be able to access all 
necessary information.’  
From the analysis of the legal provisions, the 29WP guidance and the mentioned case-law, we derive two 
points:  
 the approach to deliver information; and  
 the content of the information to be given on cookies.  
Sections 4.4.1 refers to the approach recommended to deliver information, while sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4  
and 4.4.5 provide the content of the information to be given to the user.  
4.4.1. Accessibility of information page 
On the recommended approach, the 29WP (WP208) proposes a visible notice on the use of cookies, 
displaying a link to an information page where the cookie-related information is presented (preferably 
through a layered approach). The built-in possibilities therein considered are: 
• The mechanism should provide for a visible notice on the use of cookies; 
• Prominently display a link to a designated location where all the types of cookies used by the 
website are presented; 
• Providing information in a layered approach,99 typically providing a link, or series of links, where 
the user can find out more about types of cookies being used. 
 
We have defined the requirement prescribing that the information page (entry page or cookie policy) on the 
use of BTT should be accessible through a banner, with a clickable link. 
 
Requirement Accessibility of information page 
The information page should be accessible through a cookie banner, via a visible link or a button 
Violation Inexistence of an information page 
Examples. Figure 14 shows a cookie banner compliant example, where the ‘information page’ is accessible 
through a link. 
                                               
97 29WP Working Document on the processing of personal data relating to health in electronic health records (EHR) 
(WP 131, 15 February 2007) 8. 
98 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87) para 74.  
99 Interestingly, for the EU institutions, the EDPS recommends a layered approach, where the information is given at 
different stages, providing greater detail. The essential information should be present at a sufficient level of detail to 
already put the user in control at the first layer. A notice providing (the reference to) the first level of information on 
cookies must be clearly visible to web service users whatever their landing page is. Further, the EDPS strongly 
recommends that EU institutions provide information on cookies on the web service under their control and not rely on 
external sources. If, for some reasons, the institution uses external sources, they should set up measures to manage 
relevant risks, where possible, cf. EDPS Guidelines (n 28) 15.  
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Figure 14 Compliant example’. The ‘information page’ should be accessible through a cookie banner (via a link or a 
button) (<www.lemonde.fr> accessed 18 May 2019) 
How to detect violations? A simple manual analysis of a cookie banner content is enough to identify 
whether a link to the privacy policy is accessible. Some technical means are also possible to be used to 
detect links on a cookie banner with a ‘privacy policy’ keyword or related phrases. The problem with a 
technical approach is that there is no unified standard for the names of the information pages (often called 
‘privacy policy’ or ‘cookie policy’, but sometimes simply named with ‘here’ with a link). If a standard way 
to show privacy policies is established in the future, it would become possible to detect a violation of this 
requirement automatically. Experimental methods using keywords or machine learning to detect if the link 
leads to a privacy policy may work. Such inaccurate methods would not be usable in a law suit and would 
need to be verified manually anyway. The same analysis holds for all the following requirements in this 
section 4. 
4.4.2. Content of the information on cookies 
Regarding the content of the information to be given, both the 29WP (WP208) and the recent Planet 49 
judgment100 set the necessary information to be disclosed. In particular, the Court of Justice signals that 
expiration date of cookies and third party sharing should be disclosed to users when obtaining consent, as 
listed in the requirement box.  
 
Requirement Information on cookies 
The ‘information page’ should contain: 
• Cookie name (an identifier of a cookie) and a responsible party for setting it 
• Purposes 
• Third parties with whom the cookie and corresponding information is shared (e.g. cookie 
syncing and cookie forwarding) and for what purpose 
•   Duration of cookies101  
• Typical values 
Violation Absence of any of these elements in the information page 
Examples. Figure 15 renders a partially-compliant example. Even if the ‘information page’ should contain 
all the required information for each cookie, this website contains only cookie names, responsible parties, 
purposes and retention period. Figure 16 depicts a non-compliant example wherein the ‘information page’ 
contains only groups of purposes (analytics, social, etc.) of cookies but does not provide detailed 
information on each cookie. 
 
                                               
100 cf. Planet49 Judgment (n 87) Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband v. Planet49, Case C-673/17, [2019] OJ C 112 
(ECLI:EU:C:2019:801) para 75. 
101 According to the CNIL, the validity period of cookies for France is 13 months maximum. 
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Figure 15 Partially-compliant example: The ‘information page’ should contain all the required information for each 
cookie, while this website contains only cookie names, responsible parties, purposes and retention period 
(<www.paruvendu.fr/communfo/defaultcommunfo/defaultcommunfo/infosLegales#cookies> accessed  18 May 2019)  
Figure 16 Non-compliant example: the information page contains only groups of purposes (analytics, social, etc.) of 
cookies but does not provide detailed information on the purpose per each cookie (<www.lemonde.fr/gestion-des-
cookies> accessed 18 May 2019) 
4.4.3. Information about cookie configurations  
The 29WP (WP208)102 instructs that information should refer to how the user can express his choice by 
accepting all-some-or-none cookies and how to change this choice afterwards through the settings; it states 
that ‘the ways they can signify their wishes regarding cookies i.e. how they can accept all, some or no 
cookies and to how change this preference in the future (…) and how to later withdraw their wishes 
regarding cookies’. Accordingly, information on the possibility of a refined configuration of the user’s 
preferences was designed as a sub-requirement presented in the requirement box. 
 
 
 
                                               
102 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46).  
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Requirement Information about cookie configurations  
The banner or the ‘information page’ should explain how the user can accept all, some or no 
cookies and how to change this preference in the future. For example, via banner’s buttons or 
links 
Violation Non-existence of information on configuration possibilities 
Examples. Figure 17 depicts a non-compliant banner example. This banner, besides showing general 
purposes, does not give any information on how the user can accept all, some or no cookies and how to 
change this preference in the future. Figure 18 shows a compliant banner that explains how the user can 
configure his choices.  
 
Figure 17 Violation example: this ‘information page’ only renders general purposes (not requesting consent per 
purposes) nor any information on how the user can accept all, some or no cookies and how to change this preference 
in the future (<www.dailymail.co.uk/home/index.html>  accessed  18 May 2019) 
 
Figure 15 Compliant example banner: this ‘information page’ explains how the user can configure his choices 
(<www.lemonde.fr/gestion-des-cookies> accessed  18 May 2019) 
4.4.4. Information about the data controller  
The GDPR establishes obligations to provide contact details of the controller, as defined in Article 4(7) 
and, where applicable, of the controller's representative. Such information must be shown both when 
personal data are collected from the data subject (Article 13(1)(a)) and when they have not been obtained 
from the data subject (Article 14(1)(a)) to enable the exercise of the data subject’s rights toward the 
controller or its representative, in application of the transparency principle (Article 5(1)).  
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We defined as a sub-requirement the need for the information page to incorporate the identity of the 
controller, contact details and whenever applicable, the representative.  
 
Requirement Information about the data controller 
The ‘information page’ should contain, for each third-party data controller: its identity, contact 
details, name of its representative in the EU, contact of the Data Protection Officer (DPO) 
Violation Absence of any reference about the data controller  
 
4.4.5. Information about the data subject rights 
The GDPR stipulates the need to provide information on the rights of the users (right to access and erasure; 
right to withdraw consent), about the use of data for automated decision-making and the risks of data 
transfers to a third country or an international organization. We have reproduced these rules into another 
sub-requirement for a valid consent, as shown below in the requirement box.  
 
Requirement Information about the data subject rights 
The ‘information page’ should contain the user’s rights: 
1. rights to access, erasure 
2. right to withdraw consent 
3. information on the use of data for automated decision-making 
4. risks of data transfers to a third country or an international organization 
Violation Absence to any reference on the rights and risks 
Examples. Figure 19 shows an information page in which the rights of the subjects are illustrated. However, 
as shown on Figure 20, it does not provide for all the informative elements, such as the risks of transfers of 
data. 
 
 
Figure 19 Compliant example on informed consent: the page refers the rights of the data subjects, such as the right of 
access or deletion (<www.avendrealouer.fr/RealEstate/Other/InfosCookies> accessed 18 May 2019). 
33 
 
 
Figure 20 Non-compliant example of informed consent: the information page does not show the risks of data 
transfers to a third country (<www.avendrealouer.fr/RealEstate/Other/InfosCookies> accessed  18 May 2019). 
4.5. Unambiguous consent 
For the consent to be valid, the user must give an ‘unambiguous indication’ through a ‘clear and affirmative 
action’ (Article 4(11) of the GDPR). In the following subsections we decompose further this requirement. 
4.5.1. Affirmative Action Design 
This requirement refers to an active behavior of the user through which he indicates acceptance or refusal 
of BTT (Article 5(3) and Recital 66 of the ePD). The 29WP (WP208) explains this active behavior, 
‘Active behaviour means an action the user may take, typically one that is based on a traceable 
user-client request towards the website. (…) The process by which users could signify their 
consent for cookies would be through a positive action or other active behaviour […] The 
consent mechanism should present the user with a real and meaningful choice regarding cookies 
on the entry page.’103 
Both Recital 32 GDPR and the 29WP (WP208)104 provide for concrete for cookie-based opt-in consent 
mechanisms to make sure consent is clearly given: ‘clicking on a link, or a button, image or other content 
on the entry webpage, ticking a box in or close to the space where information is presented (…) or by any 
other active behavior from which a website operator can unambiguously conclude it means specific and 
informed consent’.  
Planet49 Judgment105 made even more precise this requirement. The ruling asserts that ‘only active 
behavior on the part of the data subject with a view to giving his consent may fulfil that requirement’, 
and this wording (‘with a view to’) denotes the element of willfulness towards giving an affirmative 
consent.  
An active behavior leaves no scope for interpretation of the user’s choice. As such, behaviors presenting a 
margin of doubt do not deliver a choice and therefore are void.106 Stakeholders pinpoint instances of 
ambiguous behaviors, such as: 
 
                                               
103 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 4 and 5. 
104The 29WP refers that opt-in consent is the mechanism most aligned to Art. 5(3) of the ePD: ‘in general users lack 
the basic understanding of the collection of any data, its uses, how the technology works and more importantly how 
and where to opt-out. As a result, in practice very few people exercise the opt-out option’, cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 4 
and 5. 
105 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87) Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband v. Planet49, Case C-673/17, [2019] OJ C 112 
(ECLI:EU:C:2019:801) para 54. 
106cf 29WP (WP187) (n 45) 35. 
No information 
on the risks of data 
transfers to a third 
country or an 
international 
organization 
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• Presumed or implied consent from inactivity or silence on the part of the data subject107 (Recital 
32 of the GDPR), e.g. ‘This website uses cookies to improve your experience. Find out more’; 
• Proceeding with a service,108 e.g. ‘We’ve placed cookies on your device to help make this website 
better. By continuing to use the site we assume you consent to this’, or ‘We use cookies to give 
you the best online experience. By accessing the website, you give your consent to our use of 
cookies’; 
• Disappearance of the cookie banner without an affirmative action of the user, and a positive 
consent is registered by the fact that the user scrolled the website, visited other pages, clicked on 
links or other actions on a website; 109 
• User only clicked on a ‘more information’ on the provided link;110 
• Pre-ticked boxes.111 
In the light of the above, we define the ‘Affirmative Action Design’ requirement to make prominent this 
positive action. The consent must be registered only after an affirmative action of a user, like clicking on a 
button, checking a box, or actively selecting settings. Notice that closing a cookie banner without a consent 
being registered as ‘positive’ does not configure a violation of this requirement.  
 
Requirement Affirmative Action Design 
The consent must be registered only after an affirmative action of a user, like clicking on a 
button or checking a box 
Violation The action of closing a cookie banner. Allowing only closing the banner and forcing 
agreement on consent is a violation. Pre-ticked boxes. Disappearance of the cookie banner 
without an affirmative action of the user with a positive consent registered 
Examples. Figure 21 is an non-compliance example of the requirement of ‘Active Action Design’. It shows 
the Twitter account of the European Data Protection Board and a cookie banner provided by twitter.com, 
wherein it is not possible to exercise an active consent since the only possible action is to close the cookie 
banner, while agreeing to the use of cookies. 
 
Figure 21 Violation of the ‘Affirmative Action Design’ requirement (<https://twitter.com/eu_edpb?lang=en> 
accessed 24 September 2019) 
                                               
107 On implied consent, the ICO observes that ‘statements such as ‘‘by continuing to use this website you are agreeing 
to cookies’’ should not be used as they do not meet the requirements for valid consent required by the GDPR.  Pre-
ticked boxes or any equivalents, such as sliders defaulted to ‘’on’’, cannot be used for non-essential cookies. Users 
must have control over any non-essential cookies and they must not be set on landing pages before consent is obtained’. 
cf ICO Guidance (n 19).  
108 Controllers must avoid ambiguity (…). Merely continuing the ordinary use of a website is not conduct from which 
one can infer an indication of wishes by the data subject to signify his or her agreement to a proposed processing 
operation, cf 29WP (WP187) (n 45) 17. 
109 cf 29WP (29WP208) (n 46) 5.  
110 ibid. 
111 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87) Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband v. Planet49, Case C-673/17, [2019] OJ C 112 
(ECLI:EU:C:2019:801). 
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How to detect violations? To detect a violation of this requirement one needs to perform an action on the 
website, like closing the banner or scrolling the website and verify whether a positive consent has been 
registered. While an action on a website must be done by a human operator (because there is no standard 
design of closing banners that can be automated), verification of a registered consent can be done only with 
technical means, and only if it is known a priori how exactly (using which technology) the consent will be 
stored by the publisher. For instance, this is the case if the publisher is using IAB Europe's Transparency 
and Consent Framework, as demonstrated by Matte et al.. 112 
4.5.2. Configurable banner 
The 29WP (WP208) recommends a mechanism by which ‘the user should have an opportunity to freely 
choose between the option to accept some or all cookies or to decline all or some cookies and to retain the 
possibility to change the cookie settings in the future’. Following this guidance, we believe that a sufficient 
level of granularity of choice is demanded in the website banner design. We posit that a cookie banner must 
give the user an option to customize consent. Moreover, following Article 7(4) of the GDPR, which states 
that withdrawing consent should be as easy as giving it, we derive that giving and revoking consent should 
be easy. We argue that the choice between ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ cookies must be easy and balanced (or 
equitable).  
In a recent decision from the Spanish DPA113 it was acknowledged the need for a management system or 
cookie configuration panel that allows the user to accept and/or reject cookies in a granular way, by enabling 
a mechanism or button to reject all cookies, another to enable all cookies or to be able to do it in a granular 
way in order to manage the preferences of each user. 
In our opinion, several implementations are possible, suchlike: i) one ‘configure’ button; or ii) ‘accept’, 
‘reject’ and ‘configure’. We define the requirement related to the possibility of customization or 
configuration of the banner, as shown in the requirement box. 
 
Requirement Configurable banner 
A cookie banner must give the user an option to customize his consent. Several 
implementations are possible:  
- One ‘Configure’ button 
- Accept, Reject and Configure  
For a fair design choice, we argue that the choice between ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ must be 
balanced  
Violation A banner does not provide a fair choice in a banner configuration. When it is not possible to 
configure.  
Examples. Figure 22 illustrates a non-compliant design banner, curiously from one of the most referenced 
security and privacy conferences (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, also known as ‘Oakland’ in 
the computer security research community). In this banner, the only available option is to accept and close 
the banner, not offering a sufficient level of granularity of choice demanded by the GDPR. Figure 23 shows 
a banner design which is closer to be compliant with the ‘Configurable’ consent requirement. Through the 
indication of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ buttons, it is possible to accept and withhold consent, rendering a balanced 
choice. Configuring the choice at any time in the privacy center is also possible. As the customization of 
the preferences is easy and user friendly, the banner seems to comply with the above-mentioned 
requirement. 
                                               
112 Celestin Matte, Nataliia Bielova, Cristiana Santos, ‘Do Cookie Banners Respect my Choice? Measuring Legal 
Compliance of Banners from IAB Europe's Transparency and Consent Framework’ (2019) (arXiv preprint, 2019)  
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.09964> accessed 11 December 2019. 
113 The Spanish DPA decision reads accordingly,  
‘III. It does not provide a management system or cookie configuration panel that allows the user to eliminate 
them in a granular way. To facilitate this selection the panel may enable a mechanism or button to reject 
all cookies, another to enable all cookies or do so in a granular way to manage preferences. In this regard, 
it is considered that the information offered on the tools provided by several browsers to configure cookies 
would be complementary to the previous one, but insufficient for the intended purpose of allowing to set 
preferences in a granular or selective way’,  
See Spanish DPA decision, ‘Procedimiento PS/00300/2019’ (2019) <www.aepd.es/resoluciones/PS-00300-
2019_ORI.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=fc1f5e664f-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_10_17_04_52&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-fc1f5e664f-
190359285> accessed 11 December 2019 (our translation).  
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Figure 22 Violation of the requirement ‘Configurable consent’ 
(<www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2019/venue.html> accessed 17 May 2019) 
 
Figure 23 Balanced choice (<https://lacuerda.net/> accessed 17 May 2019) 
How to detect violations? To detect violations, a human operator needs to evaluate whether a banner gives 
a set of options to the user, which are fair and balanced. As of today, it’s not possible to verify this 
requirement automatically because of lack of standards in cookie banner design. 
4.5.3. Post-consent registration 
The GDPR mandates in Article 7(1) that controllers have the obligation to demonstrate that the data subject 
has consented to processing of his personal data, in line with accountability obligations. One way of having 
an auditable consent, according to the 29WP, is to keep a record of the received consent statements, so the 
controller can show how/when consent was obtained. Consent receipt mechanisms can be helpful in 
automatically generating such records.  
We underline that, after a certain user action done via a user interface, user consent is normally ‘registered’ 
in the user’s device (a browser in our case). We therefore use the adjective ‘registration’ to mean the consent 
is stored. Accordingly, we include the ‘Post-consent registration’ requirement, as depicted in the 
requirement box below. 
 
It’s possible 
both to accept and 
to reject  
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Requirement Post-consent registration 
The consent can be registered (e.g. stored on a terminal equipment) in a ‘consent cookie’ (or 
any other browser storage) only after an affirmative action of the user.  
Violation A consent registered without any user action.  
Example. Figure 24 refers to an example of non-compliant design of the ‘Post-consent registration’ 
requirement. When accessing the tpi.it website, it is possible to check that the user’s consent was registered 
before the user has made his choice.  
 
Figure 16 Violation of the ‘Post-consent registration’ requirement (<www.tpi.it/> accessed 17 May 2019). 
How to detect violations? Detecting violations is only possible with technical means, but only on websites 
where it is known how the consent is registered by the publisher (e.g. for websites using the IAB’s 
Transparency and Consent Framework, as demonstrated by Matte et al.). 114 For the majority of websites, 
it is not the case and therefore, detecting violations without standardizing the storage of consent is not 
possible. 
4.5.4. Correct consent registration 
We also design a requirement on the basic functionality of cookie banners: the consent that the user chooses 
in the user interface should be identical to the consent that gets registered by the website.  
 
Requirement Correct consent registration 
The registered consent must be identical to the user’s choice of consent in user interface.  
Violation A registered consent is different from the user’s choice.  
Example.  In figure 25, by using Matte et al. Cookie Glasses tool, 115 it is possible to verify whether consent 
is correctly registered by cookie banners of IAB Europe's Transparency & Consent Framework.  
                                               
114 cf  Matte et al. (n 111). 
115 Browser extension tool available at <https://github.com/Perdu/Cookie-Glasses> accessed 11 December 2019. 
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Figure 25 Browser extension showing consent registered by cookie banners of IAB Europe's Transparency & 
Consent Framework 
How to detect violations? Detecting violations is possible only by a combination of manual and technical 
means and only on websites where it is known how the consent is registered by the publisher. Manual 
verification is needed for the evaluation of the user interface in the banner. For the majority of websites, it 
is not known how consent is registered, and therefore it is not possible to detect violations without 
standardizing the storage of consent. Matte et al.116 demonstrated consent verification on the IAB Europe's 
Transparency and Consent Framework. 
4.6. Readable and accessible  
Article 7(2) of the GDPR, the consent request shall be presented in a manner which is clearly 
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain 
language. We develop each of these elements of the consent request in the following sections.  
4.6.1. Readable and accessible consent request 
We built the requirement of ‘Readable and Accessible’ consent request from the analysis of the following 
provisions: Article 7(2) GDPR, and its further articulation in Recitals 32 and 42 of the GDPR. Herewith 
we transpose their excerpts for readability. In the wording of Recital 32, ‘if the data subject's consent is to 
be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily 
disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided’. Pursuant to Recital 42, ‘a declaration of consent 
pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear 
and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms’.  
 
From these three precepts of the GDPR, we derive that the request for consent should:  
i. Be clearly distinguishable from the other matters, 
ii. Have an intelligible form,  
iii. Be in an easily accessible form,  
iv. Use clear and plain language, and  
v. Not contain unfair terms.  
 
The GDPR mandates that a failure to comply with these elements constitutes an infringement and renders 
a non-binding consent, Article 7(2) GDPR. These attributes were mostly elaborated in the 29WP Guidelines 
on Transparency and relate to how information should be disclosed.117-118 We apply them as sub-
requirements within the consent request for cookie banners, as depicted in Table 5. However, these sub-
requirements are language-based and accessibility-dependent, and we don’t cover these linguistic aspects 
in this paper, thereby excluding their compliance assessment.   
                                               
116 cf Matte et al. (n 111). 
117 ‘The GDPR puts several requirements for informed consent in place, predominantly in Article 7(2) and Recital 32. 
This leads to a higher standard for the clarity and accessibility of the information’, cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 14. 
118 The 29WP mentions that ‘transparency requirements in the GDPR apply irrespective of the legal basis for processing 
and throughout the life cycle of processing’, Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 
2016/679’ (WP260 rev.01, 29 November 2017) 6. 
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Table 5 Sub-requirements of ‘Readable and Accessible Consent Request’ 
Sub-
requirements 
29WP Guidelines on Transparency119 
(applied to information in general) 
Clearly 
distinguishable 
from the other 
matters 
 ‘This information should be clearly differentiated from other non-privacy related information 
such as contractual provisions or general terms of use. In an online context, the use of a layered 
privacy statement/notice will enable a data subject to navigate to the particular section of the 
privacy statement/notice which they want to immediately access rather than having to scroll 
through large amounts of text searching for particular issues’. 
Intelligible form  ‘[S]hould be understood by an average member of the intended audience’. 
Easily accessible 
form 
‘[T]he data subject should not have to seek out the information; it should be immediately 
apparent to them where and how this information can be accessed’. 
Using clear and 
plain language 
 ‘Information should be provided in as simple a manner as possible, avoiding complex 
sentence and language structures. The information should be concrete and definitive; it should 
not be phrased in abstract or ambivalent terms or leave room for different interpretations. In 
particular the purposes of, and legal basis for, processing the personal data should be clear. 
(…) The information provided to a data subject should not contain overly legalistic, technical 
or specialist language or terminology’. 
 
 We included the requirement of ‘Readable and Accessible Consent Request’ considering two main factors:  
 
• The reasonable expectations of data subjects (which are, in general, laymen), as evoked by the 
recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, in Planet49 judgment120 that reads: ‘due to 
the technical complexity of cookies, the asymmetrical information between provider and user and, 
more generally, the relative lack of knowledge of any average internet user, the average internet 
user cannot be expected to have a high level of knowledge of the operation of cookies’; 121 
 
• The average user needs specific information to easily determine the consequences of any consent 
he might give, in an intelligible, clear way, where layered122 information is amenable. 
4.6.2. No ‘consent wall’ 
Recital 32 of the GDPR states that the consent request should not be unnecessarily disruptive to the use of 
the service for which it is provided. In our opinion, unnecessary disruption reflects a common practice that 
we name ‘consent walls’. It means that the cookie banner is visually limiting the access to the content of 
the website (the content can also be blurred out or dimmed) before the user expresses his consent. Notice 
that ‘on interpreting ‘unnecessarily disruptive’ consent request: ‘it may be necessary that a consent request 
interrupts the user experience to some extent to make that request effective’. In line with Reenes,123 this 
disruption could merely occur depending on the user’s choice, e.g. a certain functionality may be lacking, 
such as a forum if the user does not accept social media cookies, or be replaced by other content, such as 
behavioral advertisements being replaced by other types of advertisements.  
We take the view that if there are other ways to display the overlay without blocking the access to the 
service, then such banner is preferred to a consent wall. In practical settings, the website should still be 
accessible even if the user didn’t respond to the consent request. If there are other ways to show the banner 
                                               
119 ibid p 7-8. 
120 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87) para 114. 
121On the terminology in the area of consumer protection, see Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 
97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Text with EEA relevance), ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/83/2018-07-01. See, by way of example, the judgments of the following cases: Case 
C-485/17 Verbraucherzentrale Berlin eV v Unimatic Vertriebs GmbH [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:642, para 44; Case 
C-44/17 Scotch Whisky Association v Michael Klotz  [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:415, para 47; Case C-210/96 Gut 
Springenheide and Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:369, para 31 
122 The Handbook on European Data Protection Law refers to the ‘accessibility in an online environment’, as follows: 
‘The quality of the information is important. Quality of information means that the information’s language should be 
adapted to its foreseeable recipients. Information must be given without jargon, in a clear and plain language that a 
regular user should be able to understand. Information must also be easily available to the data subject (…). 
Accessibility and visibility of the information are important elements: the information must be clearly visible and 
prominent. In an online environment, layered information notices may be a good solution, as these allow data subjects 
to choose whether to access concise or more extensive versions of information’, European Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, ‘Handbook on European Data Protection Law’ (2018 edition) (Publications Office of the European Union, 
2018) 147 
123 cf Leenes (n 61). 
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without blocking (disturbing) the access to the service, or disrupting the user experience, then it is preferred 
to a consent wall. Thus, we argue that consent walls do not configure a valid design for consent mechanisms 
they are confusing and unnecessarily disruptive of the user experience. Other consent design 
implementations could be sought while engaging the users.  
This requirement has even stronger practical significance with mobile devices. Its small configuration 
implies that consent walls can be more obvious while users do not consent. Relevantly, the ICO124 
emphasizes the user experience along with the electronic consent request implementation: 
Message boxes such as banners, pop-ups, message bars, header bars or similar techniques might 
initially seem an easy option for you to achieve compliance. However, you need to consider their 
implementation carefully, particularly in respect of the implications for the user experience. For 
example, a message box designed for display on a desktop or laptop web browser can be hard 
for the user to read or interact with when using a mobile device, meaning that the consents you 
obtain would be invalid (…) so you need to consider how you go about providing clear and 
comprehensive information without confusing users or disrupting their experience. 
The requirement box summarizes the ‘No consent wall’ requirement.     
Example. Figure 26 depicts a consent wall displayed by the website fandom.com. This consent wall allows 
to accept or reject consent. Figure 27 shows a cookie banner that is compliant with the ‘No consent wall’ 
requirement on a desktop version of the website but becomes non-compliant on a mobile device because 
the cookie banner covers the majority of the screen. Moreover, as the cookie banner of LBC website only 
proposes to accept consent, it is non-compliant with the ‘Configurable banner’ requirement (Unambiguous 
consent). As a result, the mobile version of the LBC website has a cookie banner that forces the user to 
accept the data collection and at the same time blocks access to the website, which violates the ‘No tracking 
wall’ requirement. 
 
 
Figure 17 Violation of the ‘No consent wall’ requirement (<www.fandom.com/> accessed 17 May 2019). 
 
                                               
124 cf UK DPA (n 19) 28. 
Requirement No consent walls 
The website needs to be accessible even if the user didn’t respond to request for consent.  
If there are other ways to show the banner without blocking (or disturbing) the access to the 
service, then it is preferred than a consent wall 
Violation ‘Consent wall’ that blocks the service before the user accepts or rejects consent 
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Figure 27 The Desktop version of the LBC website does not violate the ‘No consent wall’ requirement, however the 
mobile version of the same website does (<www.lbc.co.uk/> accessed 25 September 2019). 
How to detect violations? Detection of such violation is possible manually, by evaluating whether the 
cookie banner blocks access to the website or not. Currently, it’s not possible to detect this with technical 
means because there is no specification that defines which part of the website is a cookie banner.  
 
4.7. Revocable 
The GDPR establishes the right of the data subject to withdraw consent in Art. 7(3). We have made the 
‘withdrawal of consent’ an additional explicit requirement due to the practical implications of this right. 
Primarily, this right is explicitly referenced in many provisions. Article 7(3) explicitly states this right as 
one of the ‘conditions for consent’, or condition for consent validity. Among other provisions, Recital 42 
mentions the revocability of consent.  
The 29WP (WP259 rev.01)125 confirms that the GDPR gives a prominent place to the withdrawal of 
consent. The German DPA126-127 also makes salient the requirement for revocability. It states that ‘anyone 
using cookies to analyze and track user behavior for advertising purposes or have them analyzed by third 
parties generally requires the informed, voluntary, prior, active, separate and revocable consent of the user’. 
By endorsing the 29WP (WP259 rev.01)128 we claim that consent should be withdrawn through the same 
media that was obtained in the first place. 
The GDPR does not say that giving and withdrawing consent must always be done through the 
same action. However, when consent is obtained via electronic means through only one mouse-
click, swipe, or keystroke, data subjects must, in practice, be able to withdraw that consent 
equally as easily. Where consent is obtained through use of a service-specific user interface (for 
example, via a website, an app, a log-on account, the interface of an IoT device or by e-mail), 
there is no doubt a data subject must be able to withdraw consent via the same electronic 
interface, as switching to another interface for the sole reason of withdrawing consent would 
require undue effort.   
 
Furthermore, the data subject should be able to withdraw his/her consent without detriment. This means 
that a controller must make withdrawal of consent possible free of charge or without lowering service levels 
(29WP WP259 rev.01).129  
                                               
125 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 21. 
126 cf German DPA (n 10).  
127 ‘Since a consent is revocable, a corresponding option for revocation must be implemented. The revocation must be 
as easy as the granting of consent, Art. 7 (3) sentence 4 GDPR’ (our translation), cf German DPA (n 25) 9. 
128 cf 29WP (WP259 rev.01) (n 4) 21. 
129 ibid. 
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In this line, a recent decision130 of the Polish DPA against the company - ClickQuickNow Sp. z o.o. 
established that it violated the GDPR, because the mechanism of the consent withdrawal, involving the use 
of a link included in the commercial information, did not result in a quick withdrawal. It explained that 
after the link was set up, messages addressed to the person interested in withdrawing consent were 
misleading. Moreover, the company forced stating the reason for withdrawing consent, which is not 
required by the law. Furthermore, failure to indicate the reason resulted in discontinuation of the process of 
withdrawing consent. 
Revocability is foreseen for future storing/reading of cookies, hence no cookies are further set in the 
browser. This right does not have retroactive effects, meaning that it does not apply for processing that had 
taken place before withdrawal. Revocation cannot affect nor devalue already conducted research, decisions 
or processes previously taken on the basis of this data. This reasoning is supported by Article 7(3) of the 
GDPR that lays down that ‘the withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based 
on consent before its withdrawal’. Moreover, the 29WP (WP187)131 supports also this view that ‘withdrawal 
is exercised for the future, not for the data processing that took place in the past, in the period during which 
the data was collected legitimately’. 
Moreover, revocability offers also a possibility for the user (that has given consent to TBB on a website) to 
make subsequent changes/configurations to his preferences, at any time. In this line, the 29WP (WP 208)132 
mentions that revocability is ‘an option for the user to subsequently change a prior preference regarding 
cookies’. In another opinion, the 29WP (WP 259 rev.01)133 ascertains that ‘consent is a reversible decision’. 
4.7.1. Possible to change in the future 
Under the revocability requirement explained above, we define the sub-requirement of the possibility to 
withdraw consent in the future.  
 
Requirement Possible to change in the future 
The website should give an opportunity to withdraw consent after it has been given. The banner 
should allow the user to change the consent at any time. 
Violation It is not possible to withdraw consent by the same means it was asked;  
It is cumbersome to revoke – the means of withdrawing are more complex that initial consent;  
It is rather complex to understand for an average user how to remove cookies, and it’s only 
accessible to the technical experts if other browser storages, such as HTML5 localStorage or cache 
should be cleaned. Moreover, there are no means to withdraw from browser fingerprinting.  
Revoking poses a delay, while positive consent was instantaneous. 
Examples. Figures 28 and 29 show compliant banners to this requirement based on the possibility to change 
preferences in the future. The banner from the faktor.io website offers users the possibility to review and 
manage their choices by clicking the fingerprint icon on the bottom right of the screen. This icon is available 
on every page of the site.  
 
                                               
130Polish DPA, ‘Polish DPA: Withdrawal of consent shall not be impeded’ (2019) 
<https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019_en> accessed 11 December 2019. 
131 cf 29WP (WP187) (n 45) 33. 
132 cf 29WP (WP208) (n 46) 2. 
133 cf 29WP (WP 259 rev.01) 5. 
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Figure 28 Compliance with the ‘Possible to change in the future’ requirement (<www.faktor.io/> accessed 17 May 
2019). 
 
 
Figure 29 Compliance with the ‘Possible to change in the future’ requirement (https://www.faktor.io/ accessed 17 
May 2019). 
How to detect violations? Detection of this violation is possible manually, by evaluating whether there is 
a mean to change the consent after it has been given and how easy it is to revoke consent.  
4.7.2. Delete ‘consent cookie’ and communicate to third parties  
Revoking consent has two results: blocking and posterior deletion of cookies134-135 in the user’s browser, 
and as such, data processing will no longer occur. The CNIL136 states that once the consent is revoked, both 
the reading and the deposit of new cookies should be blocked. The 29WP (WP 259 rev.01)137 reasons in 
the same line, 
                                               
134 ‘Data is deleted unless it can be processed on another legal ground (for example storage requirements or as far as it 
is a necessity to fulfill the contract’, EU Commission, ‘What if somebody withdraws their consent?’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/legal-grounds-
processing-data/grounds-processing/what-if-somebody-withdraws-their-consent_en> accessed 11 December 2019. 
135 It is noticeable that the request for revoking consent doesn’t imply data erasure. For the data to be erased, the data 
subject needs to exercise this right to erasure. However, revoking consent should imply deletion of data as an immediate 
consequence. 
136 cf CNIL (n 41). 
137 cf 29WP (WP 259 rev.01) (n 4) 22. 
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As a general rule, if consent is withdrawn, all data processing operations that were based on 
consent and took place before the withdrawal of consent - and in accordance with the GDPR - 
remain lawful, however, the controller must stop the processing actions concerned. If there is no 
other lawful basis justifying the processing (e.g. further storage) of the data, they should be 
deleted by the controller (art. 17(1)(b) and (3) GDPR. (…) Controllers have an obligation to 
delete data that was processed on the basis of consent once that consent is withdrawn, assuming 
that there is no other purpose justifying the continued retention. 
 
Pursuant to the above analysis, we defined as a sub-requirement that the publisher should delete the 
registered consent and communicate this withdrawal to all the third parties who have previously received 
consent. 
 
Requirement Delete ‘consent cookie’ and communicate to third parties  
When consent is revoked, the publisher should delete the ‘consent cookie’ and communicate the 
withdrawal to all the third parties who have previously received consent. 
Violation When the ‘consent cookie’ is not deleted, and the publisher does not communicate to third parties 
that have received the consent 
Example. We cannot provide an example for this requirement. As of 2019, cookie banners rarely give users 
a way to modify their choice, and when they do, it's still unclear whether this change is actually 
communicated to third-party. 
How to detect violations? Detection of such violation is a complex task because it requires checking 
whether the publisher has communicated the withdrawal of consent to all the third parties who have 
received it in the first place. As of today, there is no system that would be able to certify this – only if 
consent storage and communication is standardized and is observable in the web browser, computer 
scientists could provide tools for complete transparency and verification of this requirement. 
5. Discussion on shared consent  
In this section, we discuss compliant scenarios related to the possibility of a shared consent. In this regard, 
it is apparent from the case law from the European Court of Justice (in its two decisions of Tele 2 and 
Deutsche Telekom, that we adapt to this context) that consent can be shared among publishers, insofar the 
processing operations pursues the same purposes, and that the user was informed thereof, as analyzed in 
section 4.3.2 (in point ii. ‘consent not required per publisher’). From these legal sources, we reason that if 
consent is collected in a lawful way, consent can be shared. Note that this observation is not explicitly 
prohibited by the law-maker. 
From practical side, however, such reasoning raises questions about shared responsibility of the data 
controllers and, most importantly, implies reliance and trust on the way consent was collected by either 
other publishers or providers of third party content.  
In section 5.1 we foresee a scenario in which content that a priori does not require consent, when merged 
with content requiring consent from another website, will then demand the website publisher to rely on the 
way that consent was collected by the third party. In section 5.2 we conclude that only a negative consent 
can be safely shared among publishers and third parties.  
5.1 Content that doesn’t require consent merged with BTT that requires consent 
Let us firstly analyze one example of a user visiting two hypothetical websites: search.com and info.com. 
Firstly, the user visits a website search.com, where a cookie named SID of search.com is placed in the 
user’s browser. This cookie is used for advertising purposes, and hence requires consent. Let’s assume a 
valid consent was collected by search.com before placing of cookies in the user’s browser. Then, the user 
visits the website info.com, and it contains a customized search engine from search.com. Therefore, while 
visiting the website info.com, the user’s browser automatically sends a request to search.com to fetch the 
needed functional content, i.e., the customized search engine. Upon this request, the browser also 
automatically attaches the cookie SID of search.com. Therefore, search.com receives its advertising cookie 
SID when the user visits the website info.com.  
In this hypothetical scenario, let us analyze how info.com can be compliant with the requirements of a valid 
consent: 
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• The publisher of the website info.com decides to collect its own consent for the search.com’s 
advertising cookie SID. To be compliant, the consent should be collected before cookies are sent 
(see ‘Prior to sending cookies’ requirement in section 4.1.2). But this prevents the loading of 
website’s functional content before consent is given (the customized search engine is not loaded 
before consent is given), and hence violates requirement on ‘No tracking walls’ (see section 4.2.2). 
The publisher, in this case, cannot collect a valid consent by itself without violating legal 
requirements and thus, has to rely on the consent collected by search.com; 
• If the publisher of info.com relies on the consent already collected by search.com, then the website 
info.com has to place full trust in how search.com has collected consent. This scenario will have 
practical and legal consequences. If the consent is not obtained in a valid way through search.com, 
then the website info.com will become jointly responsible for the non-compliant consent 
collection.  
In conclusion, when a third party merges content that doesn’t require consent (e.g., functional content) with 
the content that requires consent (e.g., advertising cookies), this forces the website publisher to rely on the 
consent collected by the third party.   
5.2 Only a negative consent can be safely shared 
We now discuss a scenario where a publisher relies on other publishers, previously visited by the user, for 
the collection of valid consent, or on third parties (as in section 5.1). If the user gives a positive consent 
(i.e., allows at least one type of data processing for at least one purpose), then if the consent collection has 
violated at least one of the requirements on valid consent (see Table 3), then the publisher can also be 
claimed responsible for such unlawful consent collection.  
This triggers a heavy responsibility burden on the publisher side, because he has no control over all the 
publishers or third parties on the way in which they collect consent (also, websites are very dynamic and 
quickly change over time, hence even if a publisher has verified consent collection in the past, such evidence 
might not hold upon a consequent visit to the same website). We underline that such model is not sustainable 
and very hard to manage for the publishers.  
However, consent can be shared if the user gives a negative consent (if the user refused all types of data 
processing for all purposes). In this case, the publisher can safely rely on this consent collected by other 
parties. Even in the case of an invalid consent in which the user gives a positive consent, but the collected 
consent is registered as a negative consent, the publisher would be complaint: he would respect a negative 
consent, and hence would not process any data (processing less data than allowed by the user’s consent is 
always valid). 
5.3 Conclusion on shared consent 
Given the concerns raised in section 5.1, we believe that the legislator, when updating the EU ePrivacy 
framework, should clarify that content requiring consent must not be merged or served with BTTs that 
require consent. Otherwise that publisher either violates one of the requirements on valid consent or is 
forced to rely on the way consent was collected by other parties. As we discussed in 5.2, relying on consent 
collected by other parties is not sustainable in practice and therefore puts a publisher in a weak and at the 
same time liable position for consent collection. We also insist that shared consent is acceptable in practice 
only when the consent is negative, however a positive shared consent places again a publisher in a complex 
and liable position at the same time.  
6. Related work  
In this section, we give the reader a summary of the current context on legal compliance to TBB. Notably, 
consent for TBB deployment has been analyzed through different prisms that we regard in this paper: audits 
to websites in order to promote responsible behavior of web publishers; through guidance policy from 
stakeholders; through enforcement decisions of the Court of Justice and DPAs; and finally, through legal 
scholarship literature. For readability issues, this section is divided in four parts. Section 6.1 refers to 
relevant audits on websites performed by DPAs, the EDPS and the 29WP. Section 6.2 considers DPAs 
guidance on the elements for a valid consent, including those for cookie banner design. Section 6.3 explains 
some of the issued complaints related to valid consent. Section 6.4 shows the related work on consent 
analysis portrayed by legal scholarship and automatic auditing of websites by computer scientists. 
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6.1. Relevant Audits on websites  
29WP Cookie Sweep Combined Analysis Report, 2015.138 This sweep included 478 websites in the e-
commerce, media and public sectors across 8 Member States. Both the automated scan and manual review 
provide the results, thusly: 74% of studied websites displayed banners, 54% of them did not request user's 
consent but were merely informative. 70% of the 16555 cookies recorded were third party cookies. More 
than half of the third party cookies were set by just 25 third party domains. The sweep showed that a banner 
was a popular method of informing visitors on the use of cookies in addition to a link in the header or footer 
to more information. Only 16% of sites offered a configurable banner. The majority relied on browser 
settings or an opt-out tool provided on a third party site (e.g. a third party advertising site). Amongst those 
sites which set the highest number of cookies, most had taken some steps to inform users about the use of 
cookies through a banner which was either permanent (requiring an active click from the user within the 
banner), a banner which disappears on the next user click anywhere on the page or timed to disappear after 
a certain length of time. 
EDPS inspection, 2019.139 This inspection was carried out on the websites of major EU institutions and 
bodies, e.g. the shared website of the European Council and the Council of the EU, the Commission, the 
Court of Justice of the EU, Europol and the European Banking Authority. The EDPS also inspected the 
websites of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), the 2018 International Conference of Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC 2018) and the EDPS website itself. The EDPS developed 
a tool that automatically collects information on personal data processed by websites. This information 
includes the use of cookies, web beacons, page elements loaded from third parties and the security of 
encrypted connections. The inspection revealed that several of the websites were not compliant with the 
Regulation nor with the ePrivacy Directive and did not follow the EDPS Guidelines on web services. One 
of the issues encountered was third-party tracking without prior consent. Other issues encountered included 
the use of trackers for web analytics without visitors’ prior consent. 
Bavarian State Office for Data Protection Supervision Audit, 2019.140 This audit found that forty 
Bavarian providers (online stores, media companies, insurance companies, banks, sports teams, etc.) use 
tracking tools, but only a quarter of the websites inform users about the use of these tools. The remaining 
providers either did not inform users at all or only informed them insufficiently about the use of tracking 
tools as part of their Privacy Policies. Regarding the use of cookie banners, 20% of websites failed to ask 
users to consent to the use of cookies. Consent obtained were either not given in advance, they were given 
uninformed, or there was a lack of voluntariness. 
Dutch Data Protection Authority Check, 2019.141 This DPA carried out a check on approximately 
175 websites of web shops, municipalities and media, etc. to determine whether they meet the 
requirements for placing tracking cookies. All checked websites are not compliant. The organizations 
behind these websites have received a letter from the AP calling on them to adjust their working 
methods accordingly. 
6.2. Guidance on a valid consent for TBB  
The analysis of the requirements for a valid consent is contained in the guidelines of the 29WP and the 
EDPS. Other Data Protection Authorities (French, UK, German, Finish and Spanish) provide guidance on 
obtaining consent for cookies and similar technologies. In this section we give a brief account of the 
significant aspects of these guidelines.     
EDPS Guidelines on the protection of personal data processed through web services provided by EU 
institutions, 2016.142 While these Guidelines are in principle aimed at the EU institutions, anyone or any 
organization interested in data protection and web services might find them useful. The main topics covered 
in these Guidelines that are useful for this paper are: the use of cookies, scripts and any other tools to be 
                                               
138Article 29 Working Party, ‘Cookie sweep combined analysis – Report’ (WP229, 3 February 2015). 
139European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘EDPS flags data protection issues on EU institutions’ websites’ (2019) 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/edpsweb_press_releases/edps-2019-04-website_inspections_en.pdf> accessed 
11 December 2019. 
140 Bavarian DPA, ‘Safe on the Internet – Data Protection Check on Digital services’ (our translation) (2019) 
<www.lda.bayern.de/media/sid_ergebnis_2019.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
141 Dutch DPA, ‘Many websites incorrectly request permission to place tracking cookies’ (our translation) (2019) 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/nieuws/ap-veel-websites-vragen-op-onjuiste-wijze-toestemming-voor-
plaatsen-tracking-cookies> accessed 11 December 2019. 
142 cf EDPS Guidelines (n 28). 
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stored or executed on the user terminal device; server-side processing of personal data and the wider issue 
of tracking. 
29WP Guidance on cookies. Per the 29WP guidelines, the following guidance documents were observed 
in our study, for they interpret closely the consent requirements in respect of cookies and BTT and were 
quoted alongside this paper.  
• ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (WP187, 13 July 2011); 
• ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (WP259 rev.01, 10 April 2018); 
• ‘Working Document 02/2013 providing guidance on obtaining consent for cookies’ (WP208, 2 
October 2013); 
• ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’ (WP194, 7 June 2012); 
• ‘Opinion 2/2010 on online behavioral advertising’, (WP171, 22 June 2010); 
• ‘Opinion 9/2014 on the application of Directive 2002/58/EC to device fingerprinting’ (WP224, 25 November 
2014). 
French DPA Guidelines on cookies and trackers, 2019.143 The CNIL published new guidelines on 
cookies and trackers. The guidelines will be supplemented, at a later stage, with sectoral recommendations 
setting out practical methods for obtaining consent. Hereby we consider the most relevant points related to 
our work on consent for cookies. Consent. By continuing to browse a website after its cookie banner is 
displayed will no longer be considered to be valid consent for cookie use. Auditable: Operators that use 
cookies and trackers will have to be able to prove that they have obtained affirmative consent from the user, 
at all times. Scope: The new guidelines apply to all types of operations involving cookies and trackers on 
any type of device, including smart phones, computers, connected vehicles and any other object connected 
to a telecommunications network open to the public. Cookie Wall: The user should not suffer any major 
inconvenience if they refuse to give or withdraw their consent. The practice of blocking access to a website 
or a mobile application unless consent is provided does not comply with the GDPR. Revocable: Users 
should be able to withdraw their consent at any time. User-friendly solutions must therefore be implemented 
to allow users to withdraw their consent as easily as they have given. Operator´s Roles and Responsibilities: 
An operator using cookies and trackers is considered to be a controller and is therefore fully responsible 
for obtaining valid consent.  
UK DPA Guidance on the rules on use of cookies and similar Technologies, 2019.144 The ICO updated 
its guidance on the use of cookies and other similar technologies. Some of the key points to note from the 
guidance are herewith described. Cookie walls may not comply with the cookie consent requirements and 
it states these as inappropriate if the use of a cookie wall is intended to require, or influence, users to agree 
to their personal data being used as a condition of accessing its service, as a user has no genuine choice but 
to accept cookies. The authority clarifies that implied consent conveyed through statements such as ‘by 
continuing to use this website you are agreeing to cookies’, pre-ticked boxes or any equivalents, such as 
sliders defaulted to ‘on’, cannot be used for non-essential cookies. Consent mechanisms incorporating a 
‘more information’ section, rather than as part of the initial banner are also deemed non-compliant on the 
basis that they do not allow users to make a choice before non-essential cookies are set. On the types of 
cookies, the ICO enunciates that advertising and analytics cookies are not ‘strictly necessary’ and are 
subjected to consent rules.   
German DPA Guidance, 2019. The German DPA published the ‘Guidelines for Telemedia Providers’145 
and Frequented Asked Questions (FAQ)146 about web tracking and cookie banners. According to the 
guidance, a cookie banner is only necessary if cookies are set through the website that require data 
protection consent; if a website only sets cookies for which the site operator does not require consent, the 
guidance considers the banner avoidable. In this guidance, consent is needed when a web service uses web 
services on its website that analyze the user across several domains, e.g., social media plugins, advertising 
networks or analysis tools such as Google Analytics. The regulator alerts that consent to the use of cookies 
must not be preselected and does not consider the opt-out procedure to be sufficient. The authority published 
also a note147 on the use of cookies and cookie banners – ‘what must be done with consent (ECJ ruling 
‘’Planet49’’)?’. 
                                               
143 cf CNIL Guidelines (n 29). 
144 cf ICO Guidance (n 19).  
145 cf German DPA Guidelines (n 25). 
146 German DPA, ‘FAQ about Cookies and Tracking’ (2019) <www.baden-wuerttemberg.datenschutz.de/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/FAQ-zu-Cookies-und-Tracking.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
147 cf German DPA (10). 
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Finish DPA Guidance on Confidential Communications, 2019.148  The NCSC-FI at Traficom mentioned 
in the guidelines that consent can be requested by using any preferred method (e.g. browser/application 
setting or pop-up window) as long as it is not requested by using a pre-ticked checkbox. The use of cookies 
and the related practices must also be indicated on a website in such a manner that a user can obtain 
additional information about them. 
Spanish DPA Guide on the Use of Cookies.149 The AEPD published new Guidelines on the Use of 
Cookies and similar technologies, which were prepared in collaboration with different organizations in the 
marketing and online advertising industries (e.g., Adigital, IAB Spain, etc.).  The Guidelines provide factors 
for categories of cookies: 
• Who manages cookies (proprietary or third-party cookies); 
• Purpose (technical, customization, analytical, and behavioral advertising cookies); and 
• Duration (session or persistent cookies). 
The AEPD provides the following examples of actions that could be considered an affirmative action: the 
use of the scroll bar, insofar as the information on cookies is visible without using it; clicking on any link 
contained in the site other than those in the second layer of information on cookies or the privacy policy 
link; on devices such as mobile phones or tablets, by swiping the initial screen and accessing the content. 
Apparently, the Guidelines indicate that users can grant their consent to the use of cookies by continuing 
browsing of a website after adequate notice has been given. Even if the Planet49 Judgment150 ruled 
otherwise, the AEPD Guidelines state: 
For the action of continuing browsing to be deemed a valid consent, the information notice must 
be displayed in a clearly visible place, so that due to its shape, color, size or location, it can be 
secured that the notice has not gone unnoticed to the user. Additionally, it will be necessary, for 
the consent to be deemed granted, that the user performs an action that can be qualified as a clear 
affirmative action. For instance, a clear affirmative action may be considered to browse to a 
different section of the website (other than the second layer of information on cookies or the 
privacy policy), to slide the scroll bar, closing the first layer notice or clicking on any content of 
the service. The mere fact of viewing the screen, moving the mouse or pressing the keyboard 
cannot be considered an acceptance.151  
6.3. Enforcement of consent by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and DPAs 
In this section we show the enforceable decisions in connection to consent requirements for TBB referred 
in judgements of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and administrative decisions issued by DPAs.  
Planet49 Judgment of the CJEU.152 On the 1st of October of 2019, the CJEU decided that the consent 
which a website user must give to the storage of and access to cookies on his or her equipment is not validly 
constituted by way of a prechecked checkbox which that user must deselect to refuse his or her consent. 
The Court notes that consent must be specific so that the fact that a user selects the button to participate in 
a promotional lottery is not sufficient for it to be concluded that the user validly gave his or her consent to 
the storage of cookies. Furthermore, according to the Court, the information that the service provider must 
give to a user includes the duration of the operation of cookies and whether or not third parties may have 
access to those cookies. 
French DPA decision. The CNIL, in 2018, sued an advertisement company Vectaury using the IAB 
framework, invoking a lack of informed, free, specific and unambiguous consent.153 For the CNIL, the 
consent text was not clear enough regarding the final use of collected data, and the formulation may lead 
users to incorrectly assume that refusing consent prevents a free access to the website or lead to more 
intrusive advertisement. It was also noted that pre-ticking consent-related checkboxes was not compliant 
                                               
148Finish Guidance, ‘Confidential Communications’ (2019) 
<www.kyberturvallisuuskeskus.fi/fi/toimintamme/saantely-ja-valvonta/luottamuksellinen-viestinta, accessed 11 
December 2019 (our translation). 
149 cf Spanish DPA Guide (n 82). 
150 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87). 
151 Author’s translation from the Spanish version.  
152 cf Planet49 Judgment (n 87). 
153 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, ‘Decision n° MED 2018-042 of October 30th, 2018 
enforcement notice against the company VECTAURY’ (2018) 
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.do?id=CNILTEXT000037594451> accessed 11 December 2019 (henceforth 
named CNIL decision).  
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with the Recital 32 of the GDPR. It was required the list of recipients of users' data to appear immediately 
when consent text is displayed. 
Complaint by the Austrian DPA and NOYB, 2018. 154 The ‘take it or leave it’ approach is one of the 
main points of a complaint against Facebook in 2018. NOYB claims that this sort of ‘take it or leave it’ 
method is not in accordance with the GDPR. 
Spanish DPA decisions. This DPA155 on the 17 of October of 2019 fined Vueling for failing to provide a 
compliant cookie banner. The poorly constructed banner did not provide a cookie configuration panel that 
allows the user to delete cookies in a granular way. It was considered that the information was insufficient 
for the intended purpose of allowing users to configure preferences in a granular or selective form.156  
This DPA also fined IKEA157 for placing cookies before users clicked the only option in the banner: the 
‘OK’ button.  Users were prompted with a cookie banner stating that ‘IKEA website uses cookies that make 
browsing much easier. More information about cookies’. Initially, users were instructed to block cookies 
through browser settings, also including ‘strictly necessary’ cookies like e.g. shopping cart cookies 
rendering the website basically impossible to use. It did not identify the purposes of the different cookies 
used, nor informed about the possibility of setting the usage preferences of the cookies. It did not 
provide a link to the panel or cookie configuration system enabled to select them in granular form.  It 
did not include a specific button or mechanism for rejecting all cookies. The warning that ‘If you do 
not change your browser settings, we will understand that you agree to receive all cookies from the 
IKEA website’ breaches consent requirements. It did not report on how to revoke the consent given. 
6.4. Related work on consent and cookie banners 
In the following we outline related work in consent rendered through cookie banners.  
In 2013, Borghi et al.158 studied the lawfulness of the collection of consent for commercial communications 
(advertisement and emails) on 200 websites from the UK. They found that, while 69% of studied websites 
asks for consent in some way, only 16.2% of them obtain a valid consent. 
Carpineto et al.159 developed a tool to automatically check the legal compliance of cookie banners in Italian 
Public Administration websites in 2016. They used language-dependent text-analysis methods and list 
based tracking cookie detection. In this study, the only considered criteria for non-compliance is whether 
the website uses tracking cookies but do not display a banner. Running their tool on these websites, they 
identified 1140 non-compliant websites placing tracking cookies in the user's browser.  
Traverso et al.160 measured the impact of the ePD's cookie policy on web tracking on 100 Italian websites. 
Visiting the same website before and after giving consent to tracking by clicking on the accept button of 
the cookie banner, they measured the difference in the number of included trackers. Their results are 
alarming: there was few differences between both scenarios. In the no-consent-given scenario, they found 
an average of 29.5 trackers per webpage, none of them containing 0 tracker, and half of them containing 
more than 16. 
Trevisan et al.161 built an automatic tool ‘CookieCheck’ to check violations of the ePD in 36 000 popular 
websites popular in the European Union (plus 4 extra-EU countries) in early 2017. Using a list-and 
heuristic-based tracking cookie detection method, they tested whether websites requested consent before 
                                               
154 cf NOYB Complaint (n 55). 
155 cf Spanish DPA decision (n 113). 
156 EDPB press release, ‘The Spanish Data Protection Authority fined the company Vueling for the cookie policy used 
on its website with 30,000 euros’ (2019) <https://edpb.europa.eu/news/national-news/2019/spanish-data-protection-
authority-fined-company-vueling-cookie-policy-used_en> accessed 11 December 2019. 
157 Spanish DPA decision, ‘Procedimiento PS/00127/2019’ (2019) <www.aepd.es/resoluciones/PS-00127-
2019_ORI.pdf> accessed 11 December 2019. 
158 Maurizio Borghi, Federico Ferretti, Stavroula Karapapa, ‘Online Data Processing Consent Under EU Law: A 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence from the UK’ (2013) International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, Volume 21, Issue 2. 
159  Caudio Carpineto, Davide Lo Re, Giovanni Romano, ‘Automatic assessment of website compliance to the European 
cookie law with CooLCheck’ (Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, ACM, 
Vienna, Austria, 2016) 135-138. 
160 Stefano Traverso, Martino Trevisan, Leonardo Giannantoni, Marco Mellia, Hassan Metwalley less, ‘Benchmark 
and comparison of tracker-blockers: Should you trust them?’ (Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference, 
Dublin, Ireland, 2017) 1-9. 
161Martino Trevisan, Stefano Traverso, Eleonora Bassi and Marco Mellia, ‘4 Years of EU Cookie Law: Results and 
Lessons Learned’ (Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Issue 2, 2019 ) 126-145. 
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installing cookies. They found that 49% of websites installed profiling cookies before user consent, a 
number raising to 74% when considering any third-party cookie. On a smaller set of 241 websites from 3 
European countries, they observed that 80.5% of those installing tracking cookies did not regard the user's 
consent. Interestingly, they observed no significant difference in the number of installed tracking cookies 
between desktop and mobile browsers.  
Van Eijk et al.162 studied cookie banners after the GDPR application. Leveraging a crowd-sourced list, they 
automatically detected cookie banners on 40.2% of European Union websites. Accessing websites from 
different countries using VPNs, they found that the provenance of the user has not so much impact as the 
expected audience of a website regarding the prevalence of banners. They also observed important 
variations between websites of different top-level domains.  
Degeling et al.163 performed a study comparing the information presented to users of EU websites before 
and after the GDPR, focusing on the changes in privacy policies and information presented to users. In 
particular, the authors studied characteristics of 31 cookie banner libraries, including several of them 
provided by CMPs of IAB Europe's TCF, by installing them locally. They observed a 6% increase in cookie 
banners adoption by website pre- and post-GDPR. They have identified the following categories within 
existing implementations of consent notices: 
• ‘No option notices’ to simply inform the user that the website uses cookies and if the user continues 
to use the website, they agree to this use; 
• ‘Confirmation-only banners’ displays button with an affirmative text, such as ‘OK’, or ‘I agree’, 
through which, by clicking on it expresses the user’s consent; 
• ‘Binary notices’ provide users with a button to accept and another to reject the use of all cookies 
on the website; 
• ‘Category-based notices’ assembles the cookies used by the website into categories. Users can 
allow or disallow cookies of each category individually by (un)checking a settings menu or 
toggling an ‘on–off’ switch; 
• ‘Vendor-based notices’ allow visitors to accept or decline cookies for each third-party service used 
by the website (conceding more fine-grained control). They originate from third-party libraries, 
as the IAB Europe’s Transparency and Consent Framework, which refers to its advertising 
partners as ‘vendors’. 
Sanchez Rola et al.164 performed a wider evaluation of the tracking in 2,000 websites, inside and outside of 
the EU. The aim was to measure how easy it is to opt-out from web tracking if the user desires to do so and 
assessing whether it is possible at all. Their results show that tracking is prevalent, happens mostly without 
user’s consent, and opt-out is difficult. 
Concerning tracking, Libert et al.,165 in a factsheet for the press, studied the impact of the GDPR on the 
amount of third-party content and cookies on news websites. On about 180 European news sites, they 
observe a 22% drop in the number of third-party cookies before (April 2018) and after (July 2018) the 
GDPR, but only 2% drop in third-party content. 
Another prominent work related to ours is the research from Utz, Degeling et al..166 The authors ran a 
number of studies, gathering ~5,000 of cookie notices from leading websites to compile a snapshot (derived 
from a random sub-sample of 1,000) of the different cookie consent mechanisms. They also worked with a 
German ecommerce website over a period of four months to study how more than 82,000 unique visitors 
to the site interacted with various cookie consent designs. In their recent study, the authors reached the 
following findings significant to our paper:  
                                               
162 Rob Van Eijk, H. Asghari, Philipp Winter, Arvind Narayanan, ‘The Impact of User Location on Cookie Notices 
(Inside and Outside of the European Union)’ (Workshop on Technology and Consumer Protection (ConPro '19),  San 
Francisco, CA, 2019). 
163 Martin Degeling, Christine Utz, Christopher Lentzsch, Henry Hosseini, Florian Schaub, Thorsten Holz, ‘We value 
your privacy... now take some cookies: Measuring the GDPR's impact on web privacy’ (Proceedings of the Network 
and Distributed System Security Symposium Symposium (NDSS), Internet Society, 2019).  
164 Iskander Sanchez-Rola, Matteo Dell’Amico, Platon Kotzias, Davide Balzarotti, Leyla Bilge, Pierre-Antoine Vervier, 
and Igor Santos, ‘Can I Opt Out Yet? GDPR and the Global Illusion of Cookie Control’ (ACM Asia Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS ’19), Auckland, New Zealand, 2019).  
165 Timothy Libert, Lucas Graves and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, ‘Changes in third-party content on European news 
websites after GDPR’ (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism Reports: Factsheet, Reuters Institute for the Study 
of Journalism, 2018). 
166 Christine Utz, Martin Degeling, Sascha Fahl, Florian Schaub, and Thorsten Holz, ‘Un)informed Consent: Studying 
GDPR Consent Notices in the Field’ (2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security 
(CCS’19), London, United Kingdom, 2019) 973-990. 
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• Cookie consent notices do not offer a choice to the users; they are placed at the bottom of the 
screen (58%); not blocking the interaction with the website (93%); and offering no options other 
than a confirmation button that does not do anything (86%); 
• The more choices offered in a cookie notice, the more likely visitors were to decline the use of 
cookies; 
• A majority also try to nudge users towards consenting (57%) — such as by using ‘dark pattern’ 
techniques like using a color to highlight the ‘agree’ button (which if clicked accepts privacy-
unfriendly defaults) vs displaying a much less visible link to ‘more options’ so that pro-privacy 
choices are buried off screen; 
• Mentioning cookies in a consent notice decreases the chance that users allow cookie use. 
The Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF), by the IAB Europe implements consent solutions for 
parties in the digital advertising chain.167 In 2018, a decision by the CNIL168-169 held that this framework 
lacks on a valid consent, and in April 2019 a formal complaint was filed against the IAB for showing a 
consent notice on its own website that forces visitors to consent if they want to access the website. 
From a legal perspective, both studies of Kosta170 and Leenes171 on a regulatory approach towards cookies 
were prominent to our analysis on the legal and technical analysis of consent requirements for BTT. Of 
particular relevance to our work is the study performed by Leenes and Kosta,172 in which the authors 
examined manually the practices of 100 Dutch websites with regard to cookie consent mechanisms. They 
found that most of these websites do not respect the ePD. Those researchers defined a four-tier classification 
of consent implementation from the analyzed banners: 
• explicit agreement to all cookies used on the site, without possibility to opt out; 
• implicit agreement to all cookies used on the site, i.e. banners whose button's text is not a response 
to a question regarding the user's consent; 
• coerced agreements to all cookies, i.e. ‘cookiewalls’, when users can't access the website without 
accepting tracking cookies; 
• detailed choice/consent of cookies, i.e. banners containing a ‘settings’ button. 
Among the 100 sites studied, they found 25 banners of the 1st type, 54 of the 2nd one, none of the 3rd one 
and 6 of the last one. 87% of visited websites installed cookies ‘of various type’ on first page load, i.e., 
irrespective of the choice of the user.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the legal requirements on how cookie banners are supposed to be 
implemented to be fully compliant with the ePrivacy Directive, the GDPR and the latest case-law. As a 
result, we defined 17 operational fine-grained technical requirements on cookie banner design. For each 
requirement we illustrated examples of compliant and non-compliant cookie banners whenever possible. 
We summarize the guidelines for compliant banners in Table 6. 
Table 6 Guidelines for compliant cookie banners 
Requirements 
High-Level 
Requirements 
Sub-Level 
Requirements 
Guidelines 
Prior Prior to setting cookies Consent must be obtained before cookies are set 
Prior to sending cookies Consent must be obtained before cookies are sent (therefore, before the 
content that sends such cookies is loaded) 
Free No merging into a contract A request for consent cannot be merged into a contract or service 
No tracking walls Blocking access to a website unless the user gives a positive consent, is not 
a valid consent 
Specific Separate consent  A consent should be separately requested for each purpose 
                                               
167 IAB Europe, ‘What Is The Transparency & Consent Framework (TCF)?’ <https://iabeurope.eu/transparency-
consent-framework/> accessed 11 December 2019. 
168 Johnny Ryan, ‘French regulator shows deep flaws in IAB’s consent framework and RTB’ (2018) 
<https://brave.com/cnil-consent-rtb/> accessed 11 December 2019. 
169 cf Cnil decision (n 154). 
170 cf Kosta (n 20). 
171 cf Leenes (n 61). 
172  Ronald Leenes, Eleni Kosta, ‘Taming the Cookie Monster with Dutch Law - A Tale of Regulatory Failure’ (2015) 
Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 31, Issue 3, 317-335. 
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per purpose 
Informed Accessibility of information 
page 
The information page should be accessible through a cookie banner, via a 
visible link or a button 
Information on cookies The ‘information page’ should contain: i. Cookie name (an identifier of a 
cookie) and a responsible party for setting it; ii. Purposes; iii. Third parties 
with whom the cookie and corresponding information is shared (e.g. cookie 
syncing and cookie forwarding) and for what purpose; iv. Duration of 
cookies; v. Typical values 
Information about cookie 
configurations  
The banner or the ‘information page’ should explain how the user can accept 
all, some or no cookies and how to change this preference in the future. For 
example, via banner’s buttons or links 
Information about the data 
controller 
The ‘information page’ should contain, for each third-party data controller: 
its identity, contact details, name of its representative in the EU, contact of 
the Data Protection Officer (DPO) 
Information about the data 
subject rights 
The ‘information page’ should contain the user’s rights: 1. rights to access, 
erasure; 2. right to withdraw consent; 3. information on the use of data for 
automated decision-making; 4. risks of data transfers to a third country or an 
international organization 
Unambiguous Affirmative  
Action Design 
The consent must be registered only after an affirmative action of a user, like 
clicking on a button or checking a box 
Configurable banner A cookie banner must give the user an option to customize his consent. 
Several implementations are possible: One ‘Configure’ button? Or ‘Accept, 
Reject and Configure’ button. For a fair design choice, we argue that the 
choice between ‘accept’ and ‘reject’ must be balanced 
Post- consent registration The consent can be registered (e.g. stored on a terminal equipment) in a 
‘consent cookie’ (or any other browser storage) only after an affirmative 
action of the user. 
Correct consent registration The registered consent must be identical to the user’s choice of consent in 
user interface. 
Readable and 
accessible 
No ‘consent wall’ The website needs to be accessible even if the user didn’t respond to request 
for consent. If there are other ways to show the banner without blocking (or 
disturbing) the access to the service, then it is preferred than a consent wall 
Revocable Possible to change in the future The website should give an opportunity to withdraw consent after it has been 
given. The banner should allow the user to change the consent at any time. 
Delete ‘consent cookie’ and 
communicate to third parties 
When consent is revoked, the publisher should delete the ‘consent cookie’ 
and communicate the withdrawal to all the third parties who have previously 
received consent. 
For each requirement, we verified if technical (with computer science tools, such as browser extensions) or 
manual (by a human operator) verification is needed to assess compliance with valid consent, (see Table 3 
in section 4). We evaluated which of the requirements are impossible to verify with certainty in the current 
architecture of the Web. In fact, the majority of the requirements (ten) are only possible to be verified 
manually by a human operator (Table 8), which means that its assessment is time-consuming and not 
scalable.  
Table 7 Requirements that can be verified only manually  
Manual  Free No merging into a contract 
No tracking walls 
Specific Separate consent per purpose 
Informed Accessibility of information page 
Information about the cookie configurations  
Information about the data controller 
Information about the data subject rights 
Unambiguous Configurable banner 
Readable and 
accessible 
No consent wall 
Revocable Possible to change in the future 
Additionally, our analysis of requirements applies only to cases when browser-based tracking technology 
(BTT) is used for the purposes that require consent (see Table 1). However, even if computer scientists can 
detect the presence of a BTT on a given website, it is not possible to identify what purpose BTT is used for 
(see the discussion on the usage of browser fingerprinting in section 5.2.5). We therefore believe that 
legislators should propose standardized and machine-readable means to specify purposes for each BTT that 
can be further analyzed automatically with technical tools at scale. 
